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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This Report aims to support current efforts in Myanmar to address land ownership and land
use disputes. Shifts in government administration, inconsistent legal property regimes,
inadequate administrative recordkeeping, and unregulated government land seizures have
resulted in wide spread conflicting claims to land. These have caused regional instability,
internal population displacement, conflict and socio-economic distress. Resolution of these
disputes through a restitution mechanism and establishment of a cohesive land ownership
and use regime is central to ultimately establishing rule of law and respect for human rights
as well as to the long-term economic development of Myanmar.
As stakeholders engage in discussions about whether, when, and how to adopt a land
restitution program as a component of more comprehensive land reform policies, best
practices and lessons learned from other countries can provide useful reference points. This
Report provides that research using international law and best practices as the analysis
framework. Six comparable countries - Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), East Timor,
Indonesia, Iraq, Kosovo, and Zimbabwe - were selected for investigation due to relevant
similarities to Myanmar’s context. These comparators represent post-conflict and/or postcolonial environments; have a significant number of refugees and internally displaced
persons (IDPs); and/or have substantial regional variation throughout the country that calls
for a land restitution approach that incorporates relevant regional distinctions.
v Bosnia & Herzegovina established a land restitution mechanism following regional
conflict in the 1990s. The mechanism sought to incorporate regional historical
practices into restitution mechanisms, account for potential local obstruction, and
address claims on residential and non-residential land.
v East Timor undertook land restitution after the conclusion of internal conflict.
Lacking a robust land governance infrastructure, the process focused on interim
measures, informal mediation, and incorporation of customary tenure.
v Indonesia has sought to recognize the rights of unregistered owners that are insecure
and that heavily impact traditional communities. It is in the process of
comprehensively reforming its legal and regulatory framework.
v Iraq attempted to establish a land restitution program following the 2003 overthrow
of Saddam Hussein. Ongoing violence and conflict presented a severe challenge as did
the failure to undertake an integrated, cohesive, and inclusive approach. The selection
of a former judicial process also proved more cumbersome and slower than an
administrative one.
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v Kosovo’s process mirrored that of BiH but had unintentional discriminatory effects
on ethnic groups. It also was hampered by poor cooperation and interaction between
agencies, particularly at the outset of the land restitution program.
v Zimbabwe undertook radical land reform in an attempt to establish equity between
ethnically “white” landowners and “black” farmers. The process was marred with
numerous challenges and lead to various human rights violations.
It also
demonstrated the difficulties with purely consensual land reform policies.
Using international frameworks such as the UN Principles on Housing and Property
Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons (Pinheiro Principles) as guidance, this report
identifies twenty-two principles that measure the efficacy and success of these restitution
programs. Through this analysis, various practices and considerations for Myanmar emerge
as described in detail below.
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Summary of Lessons Learned1
1. Define the Scope: Properly defining the scope and providing a clear timeline for land restitution
efforts facilitates effective implementation.
2.

Flexibility and Evolution: Approaches that are flexible and change as needs evolve tend to be more
impactful.

3. Determine Formality of Mechanism: Administrative, judicial, or informal approaches or some
combination of the three should be used as appropriate to the particular context.
4. Incorporate Traditional Land Rights: Traditional land rights should be accounted for in
restitution mechanisms.
5. Consider Use of Customary Institutions: Traditional, local, and/or customary institutions can
provide fora for implementation of a restitution mechanism.
6. Adopt Local, Regional and Federal Approach: Local, regional and federal strategies should be
incorporated into a land restitution policy to ensure proper coordination.
7. Consider a Staggered Approach: Where stability of the country and capacity of the government is
not reliable, mechanisms that upscale in stages may be preferable.
8. Account for Long-Term Institution Building: Long-term institution building should be a
component of mechanism to ensure sustainability and effective transitions.
9. Potential for Interim Protections: Weigh the advantages and disadvantages of interim and
transitional protections which may provide more immediate needed relief.
10. Land Restoration or Compensation: The type of redress provided should be tailored to community,
needs and circumstances of recipient and take into account relevant factors such as use of land and
access to financial institutions.
11. Consider Implications of Definitional Choices: Making deliberate choices about legal definitions
to avoid unintended future consequences.
12. Resolve Existing Conflict of Land Laws and Policy: A survey of existing land laws and policies
should identify inconsistent or conflicting laws and either remedy them or identify which take priority.
13. Address Human Rights and Ensure Non-Discrimination: Design of a mechanism should include
ongoing assessment of potential for discrimination and adverse human rights impact in compliance
with international standards.

1

For complete lessons learned, see Section VI.
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Summary Assessment Chart

2

ASSESSMENT OF LAND RESTITUTION EFFORTS BASED ON
UN PRINCIPLES ON HOUSING AND PROPERTY RESTITUTION FOR REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS
(PINHEIRO PRINCIPLES))
COUNTRY
FACTOR
Success
Transparency
Public access
facilitated by state
Transparency
(creation)
Transparency
(individual
disputes)
Nondiscrimination
Gender-sensitivity
Eligible property
Proper staffing

2

BOSNIA &
HERZEGOVINA
Moderate
Moderate
Yes

EAST TIMOR

INDONESIA

IRAQ

KOSOVO

ZIMBABWE

Moderate
Moderate
Yes

Too soon to tell
Moderate
Yes

No
Moderate
Yes

Low-moderate
Moderate
Yes

No
N/A
N/A

N/A

Transparent

Low

N/A

High

N/A

Relatively
transparent

Relatively
transparent
N/A

High

N/A

N/A

High

Moderate

Moderate

Low

Low-moderate

Low

Low
All

N/A
All land

N/A
Agrarian land

Low
Residential

N/A
N/A

Yes

Yes

Too soon to tell

Low
All real
estate
No

Yes

No

For detailed Assessment Chart, see Appendix A.

COUNTRY
FACTOR
Proper funding
Agency
independence
Standardized
process
Submission of IDP
Claims
Resolution of IDP
Claims
Community
consultation
Land registration
mechanism
Recognition of
customary land
Recognition of
undocumented
claims
Recognition of
secondary
occupants
Rule of law
Clear restitution
prioritization

BOSNIA &
HERZEGOVINA
Yes
High

EAST TIMOR

INDONESIA

IRAQ

KOSOVO

ZIMBABWE

Yes
Moderate

Yes
Moderate

No
Moderate:

Yes
High

No
Low

Yes

Unclear

Yes

Yes

No

High

At the outset,
yes
Low-moderate

N/A

N/A

High

N/A

High

N/A

N/A

Low

High

Moderate

N/A

High

Moderate

Low

Low

Low

Moderate

N/A

High

Moderate

N/A

High

High

High, but
ineffective
High

Low

Low

Low

N/A

N/A

N/A

Low

N/A

N/A

Yes

N/A

N/A

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

N/A

Yes

Yes

Yes

No
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COUNTRY
FACTOR
Favored form of
restitution
Independence, if
monetary
Opportunity for
compensation, if
restoration

BOSNIA &
HERZEGOVINA
Restoration

EAST TIMOR

INDONESIA

IRAQ

KOSOVO

ZIMBABWE

Restoration

Restoratio
n

Restoration

N/A

N/A

Selling, leasing,
dividing, or
swapping land
N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

No

N/A

No

No

Sometimes

N/A
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INTRODUCTION1
Reform of land governance and tenure systems in countries emerging from conflict can
present numerous challenges. Myanmar is currently undergoing a political reform process
that is transitioning the nation from an era of strong state control towards relative
democracy. Although the economy is rapidly developing, Myanmar continues to face multiple
prolonged internal conflicts, such as the ongoing crisis involving the Muslims in Rakhine
State. Along with political transition comes widespread social and economic changes as well
as legal and institutional reform. Land governance and dispute resolution systems in a postconflict society merit careful planning and focused implementation. However, since myriad
societal transformations that affect land tenure are occurring simultaneously, forming an
effective approach to issues of land governance can be complicated. While each reform
process faces unique challenges and dynamics, comparative case studies and international
guidance can serve as useful touchstones. This report seeks to support land restitution, land
reform, and dispute resolution efforts in Myanmar through an exploration of comparative
case studies and international standards.
The report proceeds in five parts: Part I provides a brief summary of the socio-political
climate of Myanmar in which property determinations are taking place; Part II discusses the
relevant international legal landscape; Part III explores domestic factors in Myanmar that
relate to its attempts to undertake land restitution and land reform; Part IV summarizes
applicable domestic laws; Part V presents comparative case studies from six countries
(Bosnia & Herzegovina, East Timor, Indonesia, Iraq, Kosovo, and Zimbabwe) with relevant
recent experiences with land restitution and land reform; and Part VI concludes by
synthesizing insights and lessons learned in these countries to the Myanmar context.
PART I: BACKGROUND
In 1948, the then Union of Burma, a political formation comprised of many previously quasiindependent territories, declared independence from Britain and became a parliamentary
democracy. 2 However, the Union of Burma suffered from ongoing ethnic strife that still
persists today.3 During the 1947 Panglong Conference Aung San, head of interim Burmese
government, met with ethnic minority leaders to discuss unification.4 Aung San and ethnic
leaders agreed that the new Union of Burma would be governed in a model that would retain
significant autonomy and rights for ethnic minority areas, and in return these ethnic
minorities would be loyal to the new state. 5 However, in 1947, when Aung San was
assassinated by a rival for the country’s leadership, Panglong was set aside and the new state
was created in the midst of civil war.6
Following independence from the United Kingdom, the Union first operated as a
representative democracy.7 This government lasted until the military coup of 1962, when the

armed forces took power from the parliamentary government and replaced it with a military
junta. 8 The coup, led by General U Ne Win, led to isolationist policies with a socialist
economic program.9 In response to a rapidly deteriorating economy, mass protests occurred
in August of 1988 and the army killed at least three thousand protestors.10 Ne Win resigned
and military junta succeeded in a coup a month later.11
Following two decades fraught with domestic political protests and international sanctions,
a general election was held in 2010.12 In 2011, the military junta was officially dissolved and
a civilian government was installed.13 The government signed the National Ceasefire Accord
with eight armed ethnic groups in October of 2015.14 In November 2015, Aung San Suu Kyi’s
party, the National League for Democracy, won a landslide election victory.15
Myanmar’s transition to democracy has come with the need for various reforms, in particular
related to land restitution and land claim dispute resolution. A history of complex and
inconsistent property allocation and ownership regimes as well as government seizures of
private property have led to conditions of competing claims on land that are difficult to
resolve. The resolution of these claims is complicated by a number of factors that vary greatly
from region to region, including a lack of administrative records on land ownership and use;
power imbalances at various levels of society; human rights abuses; and a rapid increase in
foreign investment.16
Moreover, as a result of decades of civil conflict, Myanmar has a high population of Internally
Displaced Persons (IDPs). After the signing of the October 2015 ceasefire, displaced peoples
in the southeast are beginning to consider the prospects of returning home, and finding their
land confiscated and transferred to private companies or otherwise occupied by individuals
with competing land claims.17 The northeast faces a different set of challenges. Only eight
ethnic armed groups signed the ceasefire; many of the militarily powerful groups did not sign,
and there is intense fighting in the northeast. 18 This violent conflict is causing new
displacement. As Myanmar works towards building peace and sustainable development,
resolution of land tenure disputes and restitution is crucial.
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PART II: LAND TENURE DISPUTES AND INTERNATIONAL BEST PRACTICES
1) FUNDAMENTALS OF LAND TENURE
Land tenure, as defined by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), is “the relationship
. . . among people . . . with respect to land and other resources.”19 In general terms, land
tenure systems determine who can use the resource of land, for how long, and under what
conditions. The rules of land tenure vary across and within countries, and disagreements
regarding these rules are often at the heart of land conflict.
There are generally four categories of rights in land tenure mechanisms: (1) private, (2)
communal, (3) open access, and (4) state.20 Private rights are assigned to a private party,
while communal rights allow each member of the community to use the land and resources
of the community (but non-community members may be excluded). Open access describes a
tenure where specific rights are not assigned to any individual but no one can be excluded,
and state tenure is when rights are assigned to a public sector entity, either for public purpose
use or for leasing to earn an income.21
Land is often governed by two forms of tenure—statutory (or formal) tenure and customary
tenure.
A. Formal Tenure
Statutory tenure includes freehold, leasehold, public, and private rental, with freehold rights
being the strongest form of statutory rights. Forms of statutory tenure are regulated by the
government, laws, and institutions, and land rights are usually registered in land
administration systems. 22 On a spectrum of land tenure, registered freeholds have the
greatest security of tenure, meaning that the land users with this land tenure have the most
confidence that they will not be deprived of the rights they enjoy over land and the economic
benefits that flow from it.23 However, many countries also have customary tenures instead
of, or in addition to, statutory tenure.
B. Customary Tenure
Customary tenure includes multiple forms of community land rights and resource access and
use rights; these rights are vested in a community, ethnic group, or family.24 Unlike statutory
tenures, which are regulated by the state, customary land rights are controlled by traditional
authorities such as chiefs and elders. While statutory land rights have legal legitimacy,
customary land rights sometimes have legal legitimacy, and sometimes just enjoy widespread
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social legitimacy.25 Customary tenure is the predominant form of tenure in many rural areas
and indigenous communities.26
Advantages to customary tenure are wide social acceptance and practice in certain parts of
the world. Customary tenure is simple to administer and readily adaptable to changing
circumstances, including conflict, and these institutions may be more resilient after conflict.27
On the other hand, the advantages of customary tenure lend themselves to limitations. For
example, the simplicity of customary institutions may cause them to more easily break down
during conflict and lose legitimacy.28
Both customary and statutory tenure schemes can raise various concerns about
accountability and human rights, specifically women’s rights. Often, customary land rights
may not be enforced in court, which contributes to insecurity of tenure. In addition, the
accountability of traditional authorities, the managers of land under customary tenure, may
be weak or may become weak.29 When this happens, there is little recourse through federal
government mechanisms and this allows potential for abuse by customary leaders in
resolving claims. However, diminished trust in institutions in conflict areas and widespread
corruption mean that similar problems can arise with statutory tenure as well. 30
Furthermore, women’s land rights are often secured through male relations under systems
of customary tenure, exacerbating the inequality between men’s and women’s access to
land.31 As discussed in Part II.4.B, statutory tenure schemes often result in bias against
women, as well, for example by favoring male heads of household when registering land.
2) LAND TENURE AND PROPERTY RIGHTS
Land tenure, as described above, is to be distinguished from property rights. The rules of
tenure regulate people’s and organizations’ relationship to land, whether legally or
customarily defined, and thus they define how property rights to land are to be allocated
within society.32 Property rights include rights to use, control, and transfer land, as well as
responsibilities and restraints associated with these land property rights.33 Property rights
define and are more commonly recognized and protected by statutory law and can include
rights over physical objects, such as houses.34 In sum, land tenure determines how land is
used, possessed, leveraged, sold, or disposed of, whereas property rights concretely define
rights to land of individuals, communities and organizations.35
The term “housing, land, and property rights” (HLP) is often used by the humanitarian sector
in conflict situations.36 The concept of HLP is captured in international human rights law
within the right to adequate housing. 37 This term is designed to ensure that vulnerable
groups are not excluded from protection, and to ensure that all housing, land, and property
rights are respected and protected in times of insecurity and conflict.38
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3) AVAILABLE MECHANISMS FOR LAND RESTITUTION
When populations have been dispossessed of their land, there are several possibilities for
restitution. The two primary forms of land restitution mechanisms are restoration and
compensation.39
A. Restoration
Land restoration is when the dispossessed party is allowed to return to his or her own land.
Restoration is intended to return displaced populations to the status quo and, in theory,
undoes any forced displacement of populations and ethnic groups that occurred during a
conflict. This is generally considered the favored type of restitution policy.40 It is favored for
practical reasons (many countries undertaking land restitution do not have sufficient funds
to effectively compensate all displaced persons), theoretical preferences (only restoration
truly embodies the concept of “restorative justice” or allows individuals to “re-assert” rights
over their land), and substantive concerns about compensation (a fear that providing money
to displaced persons will appear as though the government is sanctioning forced
displacement, that monetary compensation may have unintended consequences or that
compensation may impede people from returning to land to which they may have spiritual,
social, or cultural connections).41 Though it may be considered the better alternative, there
are significant policy concerns about land restoration such as the unintentional
discriminatory impact on women where informal land ownership of the male head of
household is formalized in such a way that marginalizes female family members’ equal right
to ownership. Another concern occurs when displaced persons originating from rural areas
were displaced at a young age and have become accustomed to urban environments and so
returning to their rural land does not fit their intended lifestyle.42
B. Compensation (monetary)
Monetary compensation occurs when a dispossessed party cannot return to his or her land
but is provided an amount of money, generally by the government, for the land. For the
reasons discussed, compensation is generally disfavored and is considered mainly where
restoration is not possible or for secondary occupants (those who moved onto land in good
faith after the original possessor was displaced); the Pinheiro Principles (later discussed) also
suggest that the best policy can be a well-crafted balance between the two, where individuals
have a choice to either restoration or monetary compensation.43 Besides the reasons already
discussed for why restoration is preferred, there can be specific practical barriers to monetary
compensation. These include a lack of knowledge by recipients in maximizing use of capital,
investment or access to financial institutions to ensure security of compensation received.44
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C. Compensation (land)
Restoration of original land and monetary compensation are the two primary policy choices
contemplated by literature for land restitution. Another possible approach is compensation
not in money but rather in land such that the party receives other land to compensate for the
previous land. 45 There are practical barriers to this type of policy: for a government to
undertake an “in kind” compensation scheme, unused land must be identified. This policy
choice, therefore, is often undertaken as part of not just a land restitution process but a more
ambitious land redistribution and reform. In the Zimbabwe case (discussed in detail in Part
V.8), land was taken from “white” landowners and redistributed to “black” farmers. This type
of land reform can also occur as part of a socialist government policy where the government
makes land public, such as in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo under the former
Yugoslavia (discussed in detail in Parts V.3 and V.8) as well as a number of Latin American
countries such as Peru and El Salvador.46
4) LAND GRIEVANCES IN POST-CONFLICT ENVIRONMENTS
Disputes over land and resources may contribute to conflict and result in delaying peacebuilding post-conflict. For example, land issues have played an integral role in all but three
of the greater-than-30 intra-state conflicts that have occurred in Africa since 1990. 47
However, land disputes are often seen as too politically sensitive or too technically
complicated to allow for comprehensive resolutions yet failures to resolve these disputes often
lead to a higher chance of relapse into conflict.48
Post-conflict land grievances can be sorted into two broad categories: (1) grievances related
to access, use, and control of land and resources, and (2) grievances that relate to security of
tenure. In the first category, common access-related disputes result from evictions or
displacements that have forced communities to move from locations they traditionally
inhabit, unequal distribution of land within society and land concentration among the elite,
contested access to, and use of, fertile land, exclusive control of high-value natural resources,
and denial of access to land with social, cultural, or religious significance or indigenous land
claims.49 In the second category, factors contributing to insecurity of tenure include rapid
urbanization, expansion of land markets and the individualization of land rights held under
customary systems, non-transparent investment in, or capture and control of, land and
resources, and new laws that are perceived to impact land rights of either elites or
communities.50
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5) INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON LAND OWNERSHIP
As explained above, land rights include the rights to occupy, enjoy, and use land and
resources; restrict or exclude others from land; transfer, sell, purchase, grant or loan; inherit
or bequeath; develop or improve; rent or sublet; and benefit financially from the sale of
crops.51 While land rights for particular groups (such as indigenous people and women) have
been established in the international legal framework, 52 strictly speaking, there is no broad
human right to land under international law.53
However, access to land is widely accepted to be entwined with multiple human rights explicit
in the international legal framework. As a source of livelihood, land access is integral to
economic rights, such as the right to work. In the case of indigenous populations, land is
linked to indigenous identities and thus land is tied to social and cultural rights. Land rights
also serve as a basis for access to food, housing and development, water, and work—all
fundamental human rights that are unambiguous in the international legal framework.54 In
both urban and rural areas, people rely on the availability of adequate tracts of land for
shelter and for resources. Particularly in rural areas, the realization of the right to food is
tied to the availability of land on which to grow crops.
More generally, human rights aspects of land affect a range of issues, including poverty
reduction and development, peacebuilding, humanitarian assistance, disaster prevention
and recovery, and urban and rural planning. People have been forcibly evicted and displaced
from their land to make way for large-scale development or business projects such as dams,
mines, oil and gas installations, or ports. A shift to large-scale farming has also led to forced
evictions and displacements in a manner that may violate the human rights of the affected
communities.55
Given that land rights are so closely entwined with multiple other human rights and overall
stability, there are international legal implications of access to land for a broad range of
human rights.56
A. Explicit Right to Land: Indigenous Populations
The first area of international law in which explicit rights to land exist is with respect to the
rights of indigenous populations. This is a clearly stated and unqualified right to land. For
many indigenous populations, land is not only a means to economic livelihood, but a source
of spiritual, cultural, and social identity. In 2007, the United Nations General Assembly
adopted the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which gives indigenous peoples
the right to the lands, territories, and resources that they have traditionally owned, occupied,
or otherwise used or acquired. Article 8 of the Declaration states in paragraph 2(b):
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“States shall provide effective mechanisms for prevention of, and redress for any
action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing them of their lands, territories or
resources.”
Myanmar voted in favor of this Declaration57 which, while not legally binding like a treaty,
represents “the dynamic development of international legal norms and reflect[s] the
commitment of states to move in certain directions, abiding by certain principles.”58
The right to land for indigenous populations is also addressed in the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); however, Myanmar is not a signatory to the covenant
and thus is not bound by it.59 Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, adopted by
the International Labour Organization (ILO) in 1989, is legally binding on States, but
Myanmar has also not ratified this convention. 60 Ratification of both instruments would
strengthen land rights of indigenous populations.
B. Non-Discrimination: Women’s Equal Right to Own Land
The second area of international human rights law where rights to land are explicitly
addressed is with respect to the rights of women. Women’s equal access to land and property
is considered an important step towards eliminating gender discrimination and promoting
equality.61 Articles 14 (on rural women) and Article 16 (on the elimination of discrimination
within the family) of the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW), ratified by Myanmar on July 22, 1997,62 address women’s equal right to
land and participation in reform efforts.
Land rights may be accessed through three main institutions – the state, the market, and
social structures such as family or community.63 In the overwhelming majority of societies,
women face unequal barriers in accessing and securing land rights, leading to unequal access
to land and land tenure. 64 This lack of equal access to land and property consequently
significantly limits women’s access to wealth, economic stability and independence.
Land tenure tends to reflect the distribution of power in society, and in most communities,
men have more power than women. As such, women have weaker land rights that are rarely
registered in law or that may be summarily revoked by men.65 Moreover, government land
allocation schemes often favor male heads of households, as do land administration systems
in general.66 Even if laws grant women equal rights in some respects and recognize certain
customary laws that provide women equal rights in relation to land, as it is in Myanmar, the
rights of many women are governed by customs that do not in fact give them equal access to
or control over land. Myanmar has highly insecure land rights for women; this is mostly due
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to cultural norms and practices that marginalize women within their households and
marriages. Many women lack the knowledge that they have rights as joint owners of family
land, or as a family member that may inherit land.
Violent conflict often has a disproportionate impact on women’s right to and access to land.
During war, the number of households headed by women increases dramatically, as men are
recruited to fight or are displaced by conflict.67 As a result women are left to support their
families often unable to demonstrate a legally verifiable claim to land or property which is
often the family’s primary source of income. Women also face difficulties in accessing
statutory dispute resolution mechanisms and an inability to access or effectively participate
in humanitarian and recovery programs.68
In paragraph 2(g) Article 14, CEDAW states that, “States Parties shall take all appropriate
measures to eliminate discrimination against women in rural areas in order to ensure, on a
basis of equality of men and women, that they participate in and benefit from rural
development and, in particular, shall ensure to such women the right to “have access to
agricultural credit and loans, marketing facilities, appropriate technology and equal
treatment in land and agrarian reform as well as in land resettlement schemes.” 69 Thus
CEDAW requires equal treatment of women in all land reform efforts.
On the issue of land ownership within the family, in paragraph 1(h) of Article 16, CEDAW
affirms that, “States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination
against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations and in particular
shall ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women:
(h) The same rights for both spouses in respect of the ownership, acquisition,
management, administration, enjoyment and disposition of property, whether free of
charge or for a valuable consideration.”70
While land rights are not specifically referenced in Article 16, the Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women (the “CEDAW Committee”), charged with
interpreting CEDAW, stated in General Recommendation No. 21 that Article 16(1)(h)
requires the following:
“In countries that are undergoing a programme of agrarian reform or redistribution
of land among groups of different ethnic origins, the right of women, regardless of
marital status, to share such redistributed land on equal terms with men should be
carefully observed.”
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In sum, CEDAW requires that States ensure women the right to equal treatment in land as
well as in land resettlement schemes. CEDAW also states that both spouses must enjoy the
same rights with respect to the ownership, acquisition, management, administration,
enjoyment, and disposition of property, in marriage.
C. Fundamental Human Rights Related to Land
Within the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), there are multiple articles that implicate
the right to own land through the protection of corollary core human rights. Myanmar has
signed but not ratified ICESCR and so it has an obligation to refrain, in good faith, from acts
that would defeat its object and purpose. 71
Economic, social, and cultural rights covered in the UDHR and ICESCR include the rights to
food and housing—rights that are intimately connected to access to land. The rights to food
and housing are also deeply intertwined with women’s equality and non-discrimination – the
inability to demonstrate legally verifiable claims to land or property, or to access or effectively
participate in humanitarian and recovery programs, interfere with women’s right to equal
access to land and access to housing.72 Without access to land, food security and general
family well-being may also be at risk.
i. Right to Food
The right to food is clearly affirmed within the international human rights framework. Article
25 of the UDHR states that “Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the
health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and
medical care . . . .” The right to food is made explicit in Article 11 of ICESCR.73 Given that
Myanmar has signed onto this covenant, it has an obligation to refrain from acts that defeat
the purpose of the treaty. Therefore, Myanmar must not impede efforts to produce and
distribute food.
ii. Right to Housing
The right to housing appears in several key international human rights treaties and is also
laid out in Article 25 of the UDHR (quoted in the above section). Housing is seen as a
fundamental right and land is often necessary to have to fulfill this right. It appears in the
ICESCR,74 the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) in paragraph 3 of Article 27, and
in the non-discrimination provisions in Article 14 of CEDAW (previously discussed in section
B). Article 27, Paragraph 3 of the CRC states: “State Parties, in accordance with national
conditions and within their means, shall take appropriate measures to assist parents and
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others responsible for the child to implement this right and shall in case of need provide
material assistance and support programmes, particularly with regard to nutrition, clothing,
and housing.” Myanmar ratified the CRC on July 15, 1991.75
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PART III: DOMESTIC FACTORS RELATED TO LAND CONFLICT
There are several characteristics unique to Myanmar that must be incorporated into any
attempt to undertake land reform and land restitution in the country. Although this Report
cannot explore all the complexities of the country, the primary issues will be discussed in this
Part.
Among these characteristics is a history of land seizures by the government but often
implicating the private sector and foreign investment; armed conflict that has led to
significant displacement; and significant variation in history, culture, and land disputes
between regions.76
1) SEIZURE OF LAND
The parties responsible for land confiscation in recent years in Myanmar include the military,
non-military government departments, companies, and local authorities 5.8%.77 Confiscated
land has been used for military projects, urban redevelopment and industrialization, and
infrastructure and agriculture projects, as well as various other projects.78 Of the amount
confiscated, 80% has been farm land, 8% deep water land, 7% forest land, and 5% other types
of land.79 These figures, compiled by the Norwegian Refugee Council and the Mekong Region
Land Governance groups, demonstrates the complex nature of land seizures in Myanmar.
A. Land Seizure by the Government
The government of Myanmar has engaged in land confiscation, both compensated and
uncompensated. These “land grabs” have increased as the state continues to open its economy
to foreign investors and pursues policies to increase industrial agricultural production. The
central government has seized land from multiple regions across the country, but the
majority of land seizure has occurred in the central Dry Zone and in ethnic minority areas
rife with natural resources. The absence of reform in land tenure arrangements, coupled with
flourishing foreign investment in land, agribusiness, and resources, has increased the
potential for land expropriation.

B. Involvement of the Business Sector and Foreign Investment
As stated above, the agricultural and ecological diversity in Myanmar lends itself to several
areas of land use. This makes Myanmar land an attractive investment. Many land
concessions have been granted in the Upland areas along the Thai and Chinese borders; land
dispossessions and loss of resource-use rights have been most prevalent there. Groups such
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as the Mekong Region Land Governance believe that this trend stems partially from the fact
that tenure in the uplands has been historically regulated by customary law, which is not
formally recognized under the current legal regime.80
The central plains, valleys, and deltas, where most of the ethnic Bamar majority population
live, are the heart of Myanmar’s agriculture business. The Dry Zone of upper central
Myanmar is supported through the growth of rice and other cash crops and most farming is
done by small farmholders. The central government has historically been very present in the
Ayeyarwaddy Delta, and thus frequently intervenes and shapes land distribution in the area.
Until recently, smallholders in the Delta region were subject to prescribed quotas – if the
farmers were unable to sell prescribed quotas to the local government, their land was
confiscated. Much of the land procured by the government in this manner has been granted
to agribusiness companies that invest in Myanmar.
2) DISPLACEMENT DUE TO ETHNIC CONFLICT
Displacement has largely been due to ongoing ethnic armed conflict in Myanmar. In some
instances, natural resources have been a leading source of conflict. Since most natural
resources are located in areas where ethnic military groups operate (including groups that
have a technical ceasefire with government forces), they are a source of tension between
regional non-state governments and the central government. Ethnic armed conflict has led
to great amounts of displacement, with people unable to return to their lands for various
reasons ranging from the existence of land mines to the inability to prove land claims.
3) REGIONAL COMPLEXITIES
There are significant differences—governmentally, culturally, ethnically, and socially—
between the different regions in Myanmar, which complicate any attempt at land reform and
land restitution. Myanmar is divided into fifteen subsections: seven regions (Ayeyawady,
Bago, Magway, Mandalay, Sagaing, Taninthayi, and Yangon); seven states (Chin, Kachin,
Kayah, Kayin, Mon, Rakhine, and Shan); and one union territory (Nay Pyi Taw).81 See Figure
1. (In this Report, the term “regions” is used in the generic sense, and includes the regions,
states, and territory in Myanmar).
Kachin has experienced continued instability and active conflict. Ongoing conflict creates
new displacement and exacerbates past displacement. According to the Norwegian Refugee
Council’s March 2017 Report, Restitution in Myanmar, farmers attempting to return to land
that they view as theirs have faced lawsuits from third parties. In addition, refugees and
IDPs have been unable to return to their residential lands. According to some stakeholders,
the Kachin wish to return to their customary lands; the majority would likely be unwilling to
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accept monetary compensation. Therefore, the success of restitution is deeply connected to a
peace agreement between the government and ethnic armed groups within Kachin.
Rakhine, like Kachin, suffers from ongoing conflict and lack of a peace agreement with the
federal government. According to USAID’s 2013 country profile of Burma, Rakhine has the
highest proportion of landless households in western Burma. Increasing numbers of people
have been displaced as Myanmar’s military presence has grown in the area. Like Kachin, it
seems unlikely that a restitution solution will be reached without also reaching a peace
agreement.
Mandalay, which lies in Myanmar’s Dry Zone, is part of the country’s central heartland
region. Most farmers in the areas are commercial farmers that grow cash crops, such as
sesame and beans for export. Mandalay has suffered from land seizures by the government,
allegedly for the development of infrastructure and industrial zones. Land seizure in
Mandalay has apparently led to skyrocketing land prices. Furthermore, GRET has found
households with lands that have been confiscated three times before by various levels of
government, ranging from ministers to high-level military members. According to USAID’s
2013 country profile of Burma, Mandalay has the highest proportion of landless households
in central Burma. In the 1970s, the former Ministry of Industry seized over 35,000 acres of
land. Officials have said that nearly 32,000 acres have since been returned to farmers.
Because of the significant variation between regions, some experts have suggested that a
regional land restitution program is preferable to a national program.82 At minimum, many
suggest that any national program must account for and incorporate local variations in land
use, disputing parties, power differentials and the needs of relevant communities.
A. Competing Political Entities
In several of Myanmar’s regions, there are armed ethnic groups and other groups at conflict
with the government, vying for control of the land and governance. To help understand the
scope of this struggle: the official Myanmar government recognized sixteen dialogue partners
at discussion on the October 2015 ceasefire agreement (four parties still have to sign the
agreement as of May 2017), most of which were armed ethnic groups with varying and
shifting allegiances; there were at least six other potential non-state armed groups that were
excluded from the talks.83 Two of the primary armed ethnic groups are the Karen National
Union (KNU) and the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), both of which are central to
the ongoing peace process negotiations.84 Both groups have existed for decades—the KNU
was formed one year before then-Burma received independence—and operate military units
along with quasi-governmental branches.85 Although the level of conflict between the central
government and each of these armed groups has ebbed and flowed over the years, with a
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decrease in violence following the ceasefire in 2015, the conflicts over who is legitimate
government in these regions are ongoing.
Beyond these armed adversaries to the official government, there is also unclear delegation
of power among the official government systems in many regions of Myanmar. State and
regional governments are run by the partially-elected legislative hluttaw, a Chief Minister,
and a cabinet.86 Administrative divisions and accountability mechanisms are often unclear
at the regional level, with multiple departments seemingly having overlapping jurisdiction.87
For example, the military still controls one-fourth of the seats in the regions.88 The lack of
clarity concerning the power division of regional governments and ongoing influence of the
military in these institutions further complicates the governance structures of the regions.
B. Varying Uses of Land Across Regions
Due to this Report’s focus on land restitution in Myanmar, a quick summary of how land is
used in the country is helpful as context. This section is necessarily a generalization because
of the complex and varying uses of land in the country, but can help inform the contours of
the broader land restitution discussion.
There is significant variation of land use across the country. Much of the northern “uplands”
traditionally have depended on shifting cultivation, or “swidden” agriculture. In recent years,
some individuals farming this land have been driven into less viable land (such as steep hills)
as population density has increased. Most of the land is harvested with staple crops (such as
rice), though there have also been shifts in the types of crops planted in these areas, including
some movement into planting opium (which can be more lucrative).89 The central “dry zone”
is generally considered the heartland agricultural area, used for commercial farming. Many
farmers face seasonal unemployment, drought, and land degradation. 90 The southern
Irrawaddy Delta region is the country’s primary rice growing area.91 Meanwhile, the land in
Shan is often seized for mining and resource extraction.92 Government-promoted large-scale
monoculture plantations, often for rubber, are mostly in Mon, Kachin, and Shan. 93 The
different way land is used in each of these regions raises different types of land disputes and
implications for land reform and land restitution.
Because different populations in Myanmar use the land in varying ways, the corresponding
land disputes also vary. Overall, about 67% of the population in Myanmar live in rural areas
and depend on agriculture for their livelihood.94 About 30–50% of the population in these
rural areas is landless.95 Just under half (49%) of the land area is forest area, and about 17%
is arable.96 Populations that depend on forest area have faced deforestation (the country lost
about 19% of its forests from 1990 to 2010) and excessive logging, threatening traditional
practices and sources of food.97 Myanmar residents that rely on both forests and agriculture

24

have faced displacement and compromised soil and water based on dam building, oil and
other natural resource extraction, mining, and large-scale agriculture projects.98
C. Regional Land Complexities
In Myanmar, both formal and customary tenure, as discussed in Part I.2, exist. In fact, since
1850, the federal government has at different times statutorily recognized twelve different
forms of formal land tenure: freehold land, grant land, agricultural land, garden land, grazing
land, culturable land, fallow land and waste land, forest land, town land, village land,
cantonment land and monastery land.99
These categories do not take into account the many forms that customary land tenure takes
in the country, none of which currently receive formal recognition (though some did during
the British colonial rule).100 Customary tenure is most common in the uplands. Different
ethnic groups practice distinctive customary tenure, but it is particularly common among the
Karen (about 7% of Myanmar’s population), who serve as a good example of the complexity
of customary tenure. The Karen traditionally practice shifting cultivation. This practice
entails clearing forests and then letting them regrow for about a decade before returning to
cultivate them again, which means that land may appear to be unused for nearly a decade
but the community is planning on returning to it once the cycle comes back around to that
plot. 101 The Karen further delineate customary land into rotational, irrigated, orchard,
communal, grazing, and sacred land.102
An important note to these delineations is that little land in Myanmar has ever been formally
registered. In 2007, the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation reported, for example, that
about one-third of agricultural households had inherited their land and 20% had purchased
it—it was unclear how the rest (about half) had obtained possession of their land.103 New
federal laws from 2012 that attempt to address these gaps are discussed in Part IV. However,
at the local level, a common thread has been that the hluttaws feel unable to solve land
disputes because of a lack of formal land registration, often suggesting locals with complaints
register their land or lodge complaints with the central government, rather than providing
solutions themselves. 104 This comes despite the fact that land registration is supposed to
occur at the local township level, overseen by officials from the General Administration
Department.105

PART IV: RELEVANT DOMESTIC LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The primary source of property rights in Myanmar is the 2008 Constitution106 which sets
forth individual rights to property, as well the government’s obligation to protect property.
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Following the onset of democratic reforms, the government also passed two key statutes
governing land tenure – The Farmland Law 2012107 and the Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Lands
Management Law 2012.108 There is apparently no official policy or legislation on internal
displacement in Myanmar. 109 Rather, constitutional and legislative enactments address
property rights more broadly. Overall, the land rights structure does not insulate many
property owners in Myanmar from arbitrary land seizures.
1) Constitutional Property Rights
The 2008 Constitution requires that the government respect an individual’s right to private
property, but simultaneously gives it wide discretion to limit the scope of, or avoid, this
obligation under certain circumstances.110 Pursuant to Article 37(a) of the Constitution, all
land rights emanate from the sovereign—the state.111 The provision explicitly states that the
union “is the ultimate owner of all lands and all natural resources above and below the
ground, above and beneath the water and in the atmosphere.”112
The first reference to individual property rights then appears in Article 37(c). That provision
places an obligation on the government to afford property rights to occupants—“the union
shall permit citizens113 right of private property, right of inheritance . . . in accord with
the law.” 114 This latter provision leaves the government free to set the scope of what
constitutes the property rights it is obligated to permit. In an oft-cited report, the Asian
Human Rights Commission has interpreted the legal regime set up by Article 37(a) and (c)
as “enabling the state to take over any land on the pretext of embarking upon a project in the
national interest.”115
The government’s substantive obligations regarding property rights in the 2008 Constitution
are similarly phrased. Article 372, discussing the right to private property, states that, “the
Union guarantees the right to ownership, the use of property and the right to private
invention and patent in the conducting of business if it is not contrary to the provisions of
this Constitution and the existing laws.”116 Perhaps most importantly, the vesting of land
“ownership” in the government under another constitutional provision, namely Article 37,
presumably creates such “contrary law.” This in turn limits Article 372’s scope vis-à-vis land
to “land-use” rather than ownership rights.
In addition, pursuant to Article 356, “[t]he Union shall protect according to law movable and
immovable properties of every citizen that are lawfully acquired.”117 This language raises
several issues pertaining to land restitution. Most importantly, although only a few land laws
are relied on in practice, many anachronistic land use statutes continue to exist in the books
as good law. Some set conflicting standards of conduct specifically as to the question of legal
acquisition. 118 In addition, over the previous decades, when the sale of land was made
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explicitly illegal, large numbers of individuals sold and purchased land informally, in what
is known as “10-Kyat contract.”119 It is unclear whether constitutional protections apply to
these lands, as they were not lawfully acquired. Also absent from mention are customary
property regimes. 120 It is likewise uncertain whether these lands are constitutionally
protected. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that none of the land-governance
statutes passed after the constitution’s adoption explicitly protect, or have been interpreted
to protect, informal or customary land regimes.121
2) Legislative Protections
In addition to the 2008 Constitution, the government passed two implementing statutes that
pertain to land rights – The Farmland Law 2012122 and The Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Lands
Management Law 2012.123 Neither statute specifically applies to the land restitution rights
of IDPs. In several places, these statutes create potential challenges to future land restitution
efforts.
A. The Farmland Law
The 2012 Farmland Law creates several rights and protections that, in line with Article 37
of the Constitution, are framed as “use” rather than ownership rights. The most important
of these rights are the right to sell, buy and lease one’s land.124 The statute also protects the
right to mortgage and inherit the land.125 To these ends, the statute expressly repeals the
Land Nationalization Act of 1953,126 which directed all lands to become government property
and made it illegal for farmers to transfer, exchange or lease their land. The Farmland Law
also creates a comprehensive compensation mechanism should the government exercise its
eminent domain power to seize the land for public use.127
However, the Farmland Law also creates several sources of confusion that could adversely
impact future restitution efforts. Most significantly, the statute makes no mention of IDPs
nor does it clearly apply to customary farming methods.128 Similarly ambiguous is whether
the Law’s compensation mechanism retroactively applies to land grabs that occurred prior to
2012.129 Moreover, the statute overlaps with existing statutes that remain good law.130 For
example, chapter 8 of the Farmland Law lays out relatively comprehensive compensation
guidelines, while, the 1894 Land Acquisition Act, still on the books, also sets out (a less
comprehensive) compensation mechanism.131
B. The 2012 Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Lands Management Law (VFVL)
The VFVL seeks to regulate and distribute unoccupied land towards more efficient purposes.
In order to do so, the statute creates a “Central Committee” to administer all “vacant, fallow
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and virgin lands.132 Pursuant to Chapter III, Section 8, the Central Committee has discretion
to permit or deny the right to use the virgin, fallow or vacant land.133
However, like the Farmland Law, the VFVL also creates potential hurdles for future land
restitution efforts. First, unoccupied land is very broadly defined. The Act pertains to (a)
“virgin” land, or “wild land and wild forest land . . . said expression shall include the lands of
forest reserve, grazing ground and fishery”;134 and (b) “vacant” land, or abandoned land that
was formerly tilled or used for breeding.135 Some scholars and commentators have suggested
this definition of “virgin” and “fallow” land encompasses uplands, waterways, graze lands
and lands on which farmers practice shifting cultivation; in other words, land managed under
customary land tenure.136 Some of these lands are also located in resource-rich areas that are
of particular interest to foreign and domestic investors.137 Therefore, it is possible that the
VFVL could potentially further complicate Myanmar’s ongoing land disputes.
In addition, under the VFVL, land that goes unused for four years reverts to government
ownership as vacant or fallow land. 138 This stands as a significant barrier to displaced
persons who have been living in refugee camps for more than four years.
C. Previous Legislative Attempts at Addressing Land Restitution
There have been limited attempts at addressing land restitution in Myanmar. The most
prominent example of this is the Reinvestigation Committee for Confiscated Farmlands and
Other Lands, created by the federal government in 2016.139 Experts on land restitution see
the Reinvestigation Committee as not adequately addressing the crisis of land tenure caused
by land confiscation and displaced persons in the country.140 The Reinvestigation Committee
faced a backlog of thousands of cases, political pressure, and a narrow mandate—it
considered cases of illegally confiscated land but did not address the land disputes facing
displaced persons.141
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PART V: COMPARATIVE COUNTRY CASE STUDIES
1) INTRODUCTION
Various countries have faced similar challenges as Myanmar and, consequently, have
implemented land restitution efforts. These comparative country case studies, along with the
international and domestic legal context, can provide a framework for understanding what
should be included in a potential land restitution and land reform efforts in Myanmar. For
this part of the report, we surveyed the land restitution and land reform programs of various
countries and identified five countries that contain socio-cultural elements relevant to
Myanmar’s context: post-conflict nations, some of which are also post-colonial, that have
undergone land policy reform with similar conditions to Myanmar such as the presence of
IDPs and multiple ethnic communities. For each case study—Bosnia and Herzegovina, East
Timor, Indonesia, Iraq, Kosovo, and Zimbabwe—we used the Pinheiro Principles and
international standards as guidance and have noted particular lessons learned that may be
relevant to Myanmar. Uganda and Sri Lanka were in the original set of countries reviewed
but were omitted after a determination that they ultimately did not offer significant lessons
for Myanmar.
2) ASSESSMENT TOOLS FOR COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES
A. The Pinheiro Principles
Spurred by the global spike in internal population displacement during and following the
civil wars of the 1990’s, the UN community began formulating coherent, unified global
standards on restitution rights142 for refugees and IDPs that embodies international human
rights standards, as well as lessons learned.143 The resulting United Nations Principles on
Housing and Restitution for Refugees and Displace Persons (Pinheiro Principles) are relied
on throughout this section as the standard against which to assess the performance of each
country case study’s restitution program.
The Pinheiro Principles were developed by the Special Rapporteur on Housing and Property
Restitution for Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons, Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, and
approved by the UN Human Rights Sub-Committee in 2005.144 The principles reflect both the
international community’s human rights standard vis-à-vis land restitution discussed above,
as well as best practices learned from national and international efforts to address postconflict displacement. Plainly stated, the principles are “designed to provide a universal
approach to dealing effectively with outstanding housing and property restitution claims.”145
Moreover, the Pinheiro Principles are drafted to apply to all those forced to leave their
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property involuntarily, regardless of the particular form of displacement (Pinheiro Principle
1) and are therefore equally applicable to all IDPs.
Pinheiro Principle 2 defines and reaffirms the right of all displaced persons to housing and
restitution adopted in earlier U.N decisions discussed above.146 The document formulates
restitution as the “right to have their land and/or home returned to them,” or alternatively,
“be compensated in cases where restoration is factually impossible. ” 147 Crucially, factual
impossibility is to be determined by an independent and impartial tribunal148 – the very kind
of institution that often is lacking in post-conflict environments.
Sections 3-10 seek to ensure that the restitution program’s implementation are guided and
informed by other crucial human rights. These include, among others, the right to nondiscrimination, gender equality, peaceful enjoyment of possessions and freedom of
movement. 149 The “right to return”, voluntarily, to one’s land is required by Section 10.
Return must be voluntary, including for IDPs not coerced.
Sections 11-22 provide for very specific procedures and standards that states designing postconflict land restitution programs should implement. These sections can in turn be used to
construct a metric to assess the performance of a country’s land restitution program.
For the purposes of this study, the substantive provisions of the Pinheiro Principles (listed in
short form in the following chart) have been synthesized into quantitative and qualitative
factors that measure the performance of each studied country’s land redistribution and
restoration program. These factors are considered throughout this section. For ease of
reference, we provide a summary chart listing these factors, as well as each studied country’s
performance vis-à-vis these factors. See Appendix: Summary Chart. 150
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Pinheiro Principles

1. Scope and
Application

2. The right to
housing and
property
restitution

3. The right to nondiscrimination

4. The right to
equality between
men and women

5. The right to be
protected from
displacement

6. The right to
privacy and respect
for the home

7. The right to
peaceful
enjoyment of
possessions

8. The right to
adequate housing

9. The right to
freedom of
movement

10. The right to
voluntary return in
safety and dignity

11. Compatibility
with international
human rights and
related standards

12. National
procedures,
institutions and
mechanisms

13. Accessibility of
restitution claims
procedures

14. Adequate
consultation and
participation in
decision-making

15. Housing, land
and property
records and
documentation

16. The rights of
tentants and other
non-owners

17. Secondary
occupants

18. Legislative
measures

19. Prohibition of
arbitrary and
discriminatory laws

20. Enforcement of
restitution
decisions and
judgments

21. Compensation

22. Responsibility
of the
international
community
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23. Interpretation

B. Alternative Principles: The Voluntary Guidelines
The Food and Agriculture Organization has also published Voluntary Guidelines on the
Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National
Food Security (“Voluntary Guidelines”).151 The Voluntary Guidelines offer a separate set of
guiding principles for land restitution and land reform, with significant detail added to flesh
out its broad principles, including sections devoted to the legal recognition and allocation of
tenure rights, transfers, and administration.152 The Voluntary Guidelines are likely to prove
informative for any country undergoing land restitution and land reform, including
Myanmar, and are respected and followed by many members of civil society.
Researchers ultimately chose to frame the analysis in this Report using the Pinheiro
Principles because they are the formal guidance from the UN and leading scholars153 in the
field of land restitution and land reform have relied on the Pinheiro Principles. Because the
Voluntary Guidelines generally align with the Pinheiro Principles and do not provide
conflicting guidance, both sources provide valid frameworks for analysis.
3) CASE STUDY 1: BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
A. Background
As with the other states that comprised the former Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s
(“BiH”) experience with land restitution and land reform has been complex, defined by ethnic
conflict, political instability, and the move from a centrally-planned socialist economy to a
market one.154 Unlike most states of the former Yugoslavia, BiH is composed of three major
ethnic groups (Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs), none of whom represent a significant majority.
This dynamic defined the state’s experience with independence and related land restitution
and land reform.155
BiH was a part of the Ottoman Empire and then the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy until
World War I. During the Ottoman era, property in BiH was largely organized through timar
and zaim, feudal estates determined by military service.156 This same system was kept by the
Austro-Hungarian regime, which also instituted a dual land registration system that
continues to this day. Under this system, local courts kept a land register and the
municipalities ran the “cadastre.” 157 Between the world wars, BiH became a part of the
Kingdom of Yugoslavia. During this time, land was redistributed from primarily wealthy
Muslim landowners to poor Serbian peasants, dissolving the share tenancy systems.158 The
Nazis treated BiH as a spoil of war during World War II, displacing Jews and Muslims from
land and awarding it to Slovene “colonists.”159
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Following the war, BiH became a Socialist Republic within the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia. Significant amounts of agricultural and industrial land as well as commercial
property, such as urban apartment buildings, were confiscated by the state during these
years, and either distributed to peasants or kept in state ownership, with individuals granted
occupancy rights.160
BiH declared independence from Yugoslavia in 1992, after a referendum that was boycotted
by Serbs living in BiH. This declaration led to violent ethnic conflict that lasted for three
years, at which point BiH was declared an independent country. Over a million residents
were displaced during the conflict, and half of the state’s housing units destroyed.161 After
the conflict ended, the international entity of the High Representative (OHR) 162 helped
facilitate a peace, which had as one of its focuses property restitution and population
return.163
The international community and the OHR continue to be invested in BiH to this day. The
country still faces social turmoil and has been referred to as a “‘neo-feudal’ state in which
power is concentrated locally, in mini-states, based on patronage, influence peddling, and
mafia-like elites.”164
B. Property Rights and Claims
There were several different groups with property rights and claims that had to be considered
when BiH and the HR began peacebuilding efforts in 1995. The primary groups were
composed of the following: individuals who had their property socialized under the Yugoslav
regime; individuals who had abandoned their property during the 1990s conflict; and
individuals who had been awarded abandoned property during the 1990s conflict.
Individuals who had their property socialized under Yugoslavia included members of all
ethnic groups. The poor land recording system and the destruction of government property
during the 1990s conflict made these claims particularly hard to prove.
Individuals who had abandoned their property during the 1990s conflict constituted over one
million Bosnian citizens who had often left their homes suddenly and had been forced by
armed combatants to sign papers signifying “abandonment” of their property.165
Individuals who had been awarded abandoned property during the 1990s conflict had
generally been reallocated “abandoned” property by one of the warring ethnic groups during
the conflict. The warring groups meant to consolidate ethnic control over areas through such
allocations, though they provided the housing for allegedly “humanitarian reasons” to people
who had fled other areas of the country.166
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C. Policy and Legal Responses
BiH and the HR adopted several policy responses in its efforts at land restitution and land
reform after the 1990s conflict. A notable omission, though, is that the state did not address
those who lost their property to socialization under Yugoslavia. These people were not eligible
for compensation or restitution of any kind.167 Overall, the system was created to return to
the pre-conflict status quo. But not to create a durable, consistent property system.
The General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP), for the first time in such an
international agreement, included the “right to return home,” and to be compensated if a
home had been destroyed. 168 These rights were grounded in the international rights of
refugees and IDPs to return. Because of the reallocation policies during the war, the parties
also adopted the condition of reciprocity. Since all three ethnic factions had given
“abandoned” property to displaced people of their own ethnicity, the post-war policy of
property repossession allowed displaced individuals to remain in their wartime property
until they were able to return to their pre-war property, or they had been compensated for it.
This included property that was socially owned. 169 Driven by international pressure, the
territories controlled by all three ethnic groups also ended the discriminatory policies and
laws concerning abandoned properties with the “laws on cessation.”170
The international community supported robust international monitors, including the United
Nation’s Property Law Implementation Plan (UN PLIP), which assisted in full
implementation of these policies. 171 PLIP was led by the UN’s High Commissioner for
Refugees, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the UN Mission in
Bosnia Herzegovina, which worked together in an attempt to create a consistent approach
towards political questions over property in BiH. These groups supported local groups in BiH
to coordinate the property mandates of the overlapping agencies and primarily worked on
ensuring that refugees returned home, that property policies were applied across BiH in a
neutral manner, and that BiH began to adopt a consistent property law scheme.172
The OHR also set up a dispute resolution body under Annex 7 of the peace agreement, the
Commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees (CRPC), which
handled disputed property claims, for both residential and non-residential property. At first,
the CRPC had no enforcement power, and was ad hoc, decentralized, and met with
obstruction by local officials.173 Its decisions were made final and binding, though, and it
ended up processing 310,000 claims in a neutral manner that has been highly praised.174
The CRPC’s primary mandate was to make final decisions on the property rights and values.
It was run by nine commissioners, three of whom were international and six of whom were
national (two each of Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks), and supported by the International
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Organisation for Migration.175 Staff included international and local lawyers, as well as other
experts with property expertise. The staff was intentionally ethnically diverse. The CRPC set
up six regional offices and eventually ran twenty-two claims collection facilities.
The CRPC was given broad powers in order to fulfill its mandate, including accessing all
property records in BiH, sending staff to investigate and process claims, adopting its own
procedural and substantive rules, and disregarding all illegal property transactions
(particularly those made under duress). It rendered final decisions that took priority over any
inconsistent decisions by other bodies (such as local courts) or documents (such as deeds).176
The CRPC was able to award either possession or compensation (as discussed below, it
generally awarded possession). 177 The process it set up allowed claimants to choose their
preferred course for using their property. However, the CRPC was a purely administrative
body and did not implement its own decisions, but rather the implementation was handled
by other domestic agencies, which were often obstructionist, particularly at the start of the
process until cooperation increased under international pressure. 178 By 1999, local courts
generally respected the binding force of CRPC decisions when claimants had trouble
repossessing their properties and the current inhabitants of property could be forcibly ejected
if they did not follow court orders. 179 By 2004, 90% of displaced claimants had recovered
binding rights on their pre-conflict properties, though not all had been able to repossess their
properties (often due to the destruction of homes, security concerns, or difficulty traveling).180
The success of the compensation side of the CRPC was never truly tested because of the
preference for restoration, but the proposed Compensation Fund, intended to be funded by
donors, did not materialize; the Fund was not self-sustaining and BiH was facing budgetary
shortfalls, which likely means the compensation mechanism would have faced significant
barriers if it had been employed.181
Complex special procedures were set up to deal with the possibility of fraudulent claims and
the extra difficulties that came with working with displaced persons who were often poor and
illiterate.182 It also took three years for the CRPC staff to build a “cadastral database” which
had “the most comprehensive and technologically advanced” database of property
information in the region to facilitate solving property claims.183
Eventually, the CRPC was generally considered a success. As stated above, by 2004, it
provided 90% of claimants displaced by the conflict binding rights on their pre-conflict
properties. Over two million people were displaced, internally or abroad as refugees, by the
conflict; by 1999, the CRPC had processed 200,000 claims and released 80,000 decisions and,
by 2003, over one million displaced persons had returned to their pre-conflict homes.184 The
precise number of those who returned is difficult to determine because many people created
lasting homes during the war and many displaced persons who returned home were also
occupying abandoned properties in other regions during the war. 185 Those who occupied
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abandoned properties during the war almost always had their interests subordinated to the
pre-war occupants, although if they themselves had been displaced, they were eligible for
emergency housing.186 Because the CRPC was focused on the claims of those displaced by the
1990s conflict, its mandate did not encompass and did not assist those individuals displaced
by the Yugoslav socialist regime.
D. Lessons Learned
The BiH post-conflict restitution approach has generally been praised as successful given its
relatively narrow focus.187 The primary flaw was that there was no restitution (restoration or
compensation) for property owners whose land had been socialized under the Yugoslav
regime. There were specific problems with the implementation as well. Military officials from
the Yugoslav People’s Army, for example, often had their property rights in socially owned
apartments revoked if they failed to meet strict criteria under the federal “Apartments Law,”
since they were not considered refugees under that law. This law was eventually amended
following criticism and decisions before the European Court of Human Rights and other legal
bodies but the CRPC never required the government amend it. This was criticized as
collective punishment for the aggressors.188
The BiH land restitution and land reform process was the first one in the former Yugoslavia
and it helped provide a framework for future land efforts in the region. Its focus, which was
followed in Kosovo (see Part V.7), was on returning property rights to the pre-war status quo.
This included returning property to those who had lived there without proper title and
allowing title disputes that existed pre-war to be solved by the courts at a later date.189
One important lesson from BiH is the necessity of incorporating regional historical practices
into property schemes. In BiH, this meant understanding the role of socially owned property
and occupancy rights as well as how to handle restitution for the secondary residents of
property (those who took occupancy as displaced persons during the war). The process also
showed the international community that property rights should be respected as their own
right, not just as a means to accomplish the right to return home. Finally, the BiH experience
showed the potential for local officials’ obstruction and the need for a formal mechanism to
handle disputes that could not be undermined by such officials.190
4) CASE STUDY 2: EAST TIMOR
A. Background
East Timor’s land tenure problems stem from its complicated political history. Since first
being discovered by Portuguese explorers in the 1500s, it was first a Portuguese colony and
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then later, an Indonesian province. In 1974, the Portuguese dictatorship ended and the
process of decolonization began. East Timor unilaterally declared independence on the 28th
of November, 1975.
That year Indonesia invaded East Timor and, over the next two decades, engaged in
aggressive acts, killings and disappearances in East Timor. At the time, Indonesia occupied
West Timor, and fearing that an independent East Timor would threaten Indonesia’s
security, decided to heavily support people willing to integrate with Indonesia. A civil war
ensued between parties in favor of independence for East Timor and those in favor of
integration with Indonesia. Indonesian troops invaded East Timor and declared it to be a
province. However, the East Timorese were dissatisfied with Indonesian rule, and voted in a
1999 referendum in favor of independence. The Indonesian military was angered by the
outcome of this vote and violently retaliated against the East Timorese.
East Timor was declared an independent nation in 2002, but the country was left with
numerous challenges in the aftermath of the Indonesian military violence post-referendum.
From 1999-2002, East Timor was administrated by the United Nations Transitional
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). UNTAET was established on 25 October 1999 to
administer the territory, exercise legislative and executive authority during the transition
period and support the building of self-government. East Timor gained its independence as a
country on 20 May 2002. Many of the country’s land records were destroyed in the period of
violence preceding UNTAET’s administration; the Indonesian military had purposely torched
buildings and land titles. It is estimated that eighty percent of Indonesian land records in
East Timor were destroyed.191 Given that East Timor was first a Portuguese territory and
then an Indonesian one, this alone would have created a number of conflicting land title
issues. However, in addition, the violence of the Indonesian military resulted in a country
with housing shortages and considerable difficulty in ascertaining ownership of land.
East Timor is therefore both a post-conflict and a post-colonial environment.192 As such, it
faces post-conflict issues such as the return of refugees, inadequate shelter, restoration of
land records, and restoration of institutions of governance.193 In terms of post-colonial issues,
East Timor has had to implement a new government, build new infrastructure, employ a
method with which to resolve land conflicts and develop a land tenure system that can
address the injustices of colonial and invasion rule.194
B. Property Rights and Claims
Post-referendum, East Timor saw an abundance of land claims based on claims from various
times throughout the country’s history. There are four categories of potential claimants of
land in East Timor. Claimants can be customary owners of the land, individuals who acquired
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land under Portuguese title, individuals who acquired land under Indonesian title, and
individuals in current possession of the land.195
Traditional occupiers of land include those who hold customary rights to land. Given that
customary land is not recognized in the legal system, most land in the rural areas of East
Timor is not recognized in any formal system; the land is distributed in accordance with
traditional institutions and is normally held in community-based groups.
Individuals who acquired land under Portuguese rule include the people who acquired title
to land during East Timor’s time as a Portuguese colony. The claims made by these people
have involved titles for very valuable land, and concerns were raised that recognizing these
claims would result in a small colonial elite holding some large and valuable parcels of land
in East Timor. 196 Recognition of these titles was found to be justified under the law of
“belligerent occupation” which would conclude that since Indonesia was a belligerent
occupier, Portuguese law remained, in effect, the underlying law of East Timor during the
period of Indonesia’s occupation.197 Thus, since the land titles issued under Portuguese rule
should have been recognized during Indonesia’s occupation, they should still be recognized
today.
Individuals who acquired land under Indonesian rule were overwhelmingly wealthy
Indonesian families and corporations. Few East Timorese acquired these titles. Some
suggested that the belligerent occupation rule applied and so invalidated the recognition of
any Indonesian titles. However, others argued that the East Timorese who did acquire land
under Indonesian rule did so in good faith. In addition, finding the titles acquired under
Indonesian rule invalid would have likely conflicted with international standards relating to
housing security and protection against unreasonable evictions.198 Finally, it was not clear
that the Constitution terminated past rights of non-nationals or that, even if it did, it
terminated land use rights rather than simply ownership rights.
Individuals who are currently occupying land were the final group of land claimants. Due to
political unrest over the past 40 years, there are high levels of displaced groups in East Timor.
Many properties are occupied by people who are not recorded owners. Moreover, at issue were
not only claims by original owners of land, but also claims of people who entered into land
contracts with people who were not the rightful owners of the land.199
C. Policy and Legal Responses
To resolve these various arguably legitimate competing claims, a mediation model for
addressing conflicts over land was introduced in East Timor by the UN Transitional
Administration in 2000. 200 Mediation takes place both through this formal structure and
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through ad hoc channels. East Timor’s National Directorate of Land and Property helps with
mediation, but the mediation itself can follow many paths. The system involves interim noviolence agreements that may be sealed by ritual and witnessed by traditional, government,
and church representatives. A benefit of this program is that it embeds the mediation system
in land administration rather than judicial administration which allows for remedies to be
reached that are unavailable to the courts, such as selling, leasing, dividing, or swapping
land.201 It also creates a bridge between traditional dispute-resolution mechanisms and the
courts; this is advantageous because when parties agree, they may use ritual and customary
institutions, and when they are unable to agree, they may resort to the court system. 202
However, mediation will not occur if the land subject to dispute is the property of the state
or if one of the parties is an officer of government.203
The mediation process is as follows:204
1. A claimant goes to the National Land and Property Directorate or the District
Land and Property Directorate office and requests mediation. A dispute may also
be referred to the directorate by a village head if the parties agree to this.
2. The other parties to the dispute are informed of the claim. Mediation proceeds only
when all the parties to the dispute voluntarily accept the mediation.
3. The parties to the dispute agree to a Land and Property Directorate mediator.
4. A directorate mediator visits the disputed land and gathers information about the
history of ownership from local informants.
5. The directorate mediator invites the claimant and current occupant to separate
meetings to hear each side of the dispute. Evidence may be presented that includes
public and private documents, witnesses, and physical proof.
6. The directorate mediator then meets with the claimant and the current occupant
together in order to try and find a solution that is acceptable to both parties.
7. During these meetings, the directorate mediator may facilitate interim
agreements relating to land use and commitments not to engage in violence during
pending resolution of the conflict. The mediator may also suggest possible
solutions to the conflict, such as dividing, selling, leasing, or swapping the land.
8. The matter will be resolved if a solution agreeable to both parties is reached. If the
parties fail to reach an agreement after three joint meetings, the dispute is
referred to the courts.
9. If a settlement is reached, a report is produced and signed by both parties and the
directorate mediator. The settlement is then registered with the Land and
Property Directorate.
Mediation of land conflicts by the Land and Property Directorate has been more successful
than resolution through the courts. In particular, East Timorese prefer to resolve disputes at
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the local and customary level and this system allows them to do this. Using local mechanisms
for dispute resolution is cheaper, faster, and more accessible. Between May 2002 to June
2007, out of 747 disputes brought to the Land and Property Directorate, 240 were marked as
resolved.
In 2009, the Minister of Justice produced the “Draft Law on the Special Regime for
Attributing Property Rights” but it has not yet been approved by the government. It was
vetoed by the president in 2012 because traditional tenure was insufficiently protected and
the law made no explicit recognition of customary forms of tenure. As of 2002, East Timor
did not have a functioning land registry, an effective regime to govern and legalize foreign
interests in land or a framework to determine competing claims to land.205
D. Lessons Learned
Several lessons can be derived from East Timor’s post-conflict land situation. First, where
there is destruction of property, records, housing, and infrastructure, it is imperative that
interim measures be taken to ameliorate land administration problems caused by the process
of refugee return. One such measure is to divert returnees (refugees and IDPs), particularly
those that lack housing of their own, to temporary transit housing centers.206 This results in
a minimization of rushing to occupy habitable homes and aids in the long-term process of reestablishing land administration. This kind of interim land administration helps to manage
the process of return and reconstruction without the necessity of final determination of
underlying ownership, which requires more time, building, and infrastructure. Second, the
establishment of a land claims commission in East Timor was postponed and interim
solutions provided some mechanism to regulate private transactions of land.207 In addition,
de facto situations start to consolidate more and more with time. As it becomes more difficult
to return land already filled with current occupants.
The development of a system that enhances certainty in post-conflict land administration
without necessarily resolving the underlying issue of land ownership can be successful if it is
focused on transactions rather than title.208 Such a system can provide incentives for those
taking private interests in land to register their transactions and it includes the potential for
this registration to provide more certainty of title as time goes on.
5) CASE STUDY 3: INDONESIA
A. Background
Before its independence in 1945, Indonesia was always under some form of colonial rule. Its
land situation is informed by this; the land laws that evolved were a mixture of western
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systems (to satisfy the interests of the colonial governments) and the traditional unwritten
laws based on customary rights to land which existed in Indonesian cultural groups. 209
Indonesia sought to end this dualism in land law through the passage of the Basic Agrarian
Law.
B. Property Rights and Claims
An increased focus on rapid economic development in Indonesia from the 1960s to the 1990s
left certain segments of the population neglected; in particular, rural landlessness is a
significant problem, especially on Java.210 Generally, land rights of unregistered land owners
are insecure, which greatly affects traditional communities. Many traditional communities
live in forest areas with land owned through customary tenure; Indonesia’s significant
deforestation comes with an increasing high cost to traditional communities who rely on the
forests for their livelihood. Since their land rights are not formally recorded, they historically
have been unrecognized by the state. Uncertainties over policy and regulatory practices, as
well as overlapping land-use and property rights in general, have created frictions between
the central and local governments and between businesses (mostly the mining and palm oil
sectors) and local communities.211
Indonesia’s 1999 Forestry Law effectively allowed the government to convert customary
forests into state forests and, once under state jurisdiction, these forests could be converted
into private concessions. Thirty percent of Indonesia’s lands had been given to private
companies as concessions, and many of these territories overlapped with indigenous lands.212
Most land claims in Indonesia come from a desire from indigenous peoples to assert or
strengthen their land rights over forest lands.
C. Policy and Legal Responses
Indonesia’s land rights are primarily governed by the Basic Agrarian Law, Law No. 5 of 1960
(the “BAL”). This land policy pertains to 30% of Indonesia’s land; the other 70% was classified
as state forest land under the Basic Forestry Act of 1967.213 This 70% of Indonesian land is
not subject to agrarian law and makes the state and its forestry institutions the single largest
landlord in the country. Declaring 70% of Indonesia as forest land and state-owned resulted
in dispossession and a multitude of land grabbing by the military, enterprises, and state
institutions.214 The BAL defines the fundamental types of rights that may be held by private
individuals and entities and it describes the role of the state with regard to its regulation of
private rights and private uses of land. 215 It states that Indonesia’s agrarian law is
Indonesian customary law as long as it does not conflict with other regulations or national
interests.
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There are currently five types of basic tenure, with the highest and closest to freehold tenure
called Hak Milik, this tenure is the same as ownership. Hak Guna Usaha is cultivation only;
Hak Guna Bangunan is building only; Hak Pakai is use only; and Hak Pengenolaan is land
management only.216
Customary land law (adat) governs Indonesia’s traditional communal land tenure system.
Article 5 of the BAL states that Indonesia’s agrarian law is adat law, but it also considers
these customary laws to be incompatible with economic development and expects adat to
gradually adapt to national law or be replaced by it.217 The government has been hostile for
a few decades to the continued existence of communal tenure.218
The institutional land governance framework appears to be decentralized. Given that there
are inefficiencies across agencies with large overlap in mandate, the administration of
governance and application of policies have been inconsistent and discretion abused.219 In
1999, the formerly centralized system was decentralized and large powers were given to the
regional governments. There is currently a mix that resembles a top down system with
regards to development, with regional governments making plans but the central
government having the authority to override locally-made plans.220
Indonesia commenced a Land Administration Project (LAP I) in 1994. The project aimed to
accelerate land titling and registration by systematically mapping and registering rights for
land for parcels in all non-forest areas; to strengthen the National Land Agency as an
institution so that it can achieve the objectives of the program; and to support the government
of Indonesia’s efforts to come up with a long term policy for land management through a
series of studies.221 The Land Management and Policy Development Project (LMPDP) was
intended to follow LAP I but focus more on institutional development.
There are multiple land rights issues that must be addressed in legislation going forward.
The existence of both formal and customary law leads to ambiguity in interpretation and
often leads to the undermining of land rights and increased disputes and conflict over land.
The land registration system that Indonesia does have is overly complex, creating
inefficiencies that weaken security of tenure and the development of a functioning land
market.222 Another problem is that a focus on economic development has led to deforestation
that significantly threatens Indonesia’s forest resources, to the point of impacting global
climate change. Finally, rural landlessness has led to livelihood and food insecurities for
millions of families.
There has been an increasing focus on protection of community rights and that of indigenous
persons. In March of 2017, the World Bank approved a $6.25 million grant to help Indonesia’s

42

indigenous and local communities secure land rights, manage forests, and improve their
livelihoods. Given that forestry is an important source of income for many of Indonesia’s rural
communities, the grant will help address deforestation and strengthening of indigenous
peoples’ rights. President Joko Widodo announced in 2017 that Indonesia would return
13,000 hectares of customary lands to nine indigenous communities and committed to
returning 12.7 million hectares to local and indigenous groups. 223 Indonesia’s decision to
return customary lands to indigenous peoples was considered a landmark achievement.
D. Lessons Learned
Indonesia provides important lessons for land disputes that stem from the government’s
taking of customary lands. In the case of Indonesia, an overly cumbersome land registration
system may not be an improvement on lack of registration altogether. The financial burdens
associated with registering land in Indonesia served as a barrier to doing so. In addition, the
complex system lead to ambiguities and a lack of clear rights and procedures for registering
communal rights. Since customary practices differ across communities in separate districts,
this central registration system is unproductive. A better administration solution would
involve working with districts to understand processes for identifying, describing, and
registering customary land rights of traditional communities. Districts would also be able to
develop local guidelines for implementing more transparent procedures.
One more lesson is that legislation that resolves ambiguities between customary and formal
land laws may be necessary to effective land restitution. If legislation can clarify the
differences between the two and provide a mechanism for translating one into the other, this
might reduce confusion and conflict between the co-existing customary and formal systems.
6) CASE STUDY 4: IRAQ
A. Background
Iraq is composed of three primary ethnic groups—Shia Arabs (the majority), Sunni Arabs,
and Iraqi Kurds—as well as a number of smaller minority groups, such as the Christian
Yazidis, Assyrians, and Turkmen. The Shia majority and Kurds were “viciously suppressed”
for much of the latter half of the twentieth century, under the Ba’ath regime.224 The 2005
Constitution recognizes the autonomy of the Kurdish region, Kurdistan, in northern Iraq.225
Iraq was a part of the Ottoman Empire until World War I, after which it came under British
control. During the Ottoman era, property was classified under the quasi-feudal TAPU
system which issued title deeds and ran a land registry. Individual property rights were
recognized.226 In 1932, Iraq gained independence and became the Kingdom of Iraq, under the
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control of a Hashemite monarch. This king was overthrown in 1958, and the Republic of Iraq
took place of the Kingdom. Two successive coups in 1963 overthrew the government and the
Ba’ath Party (which had been behind the first of the 1963 coups) attempted another coup in
1968, through which it succeeded in taking control of the government. There were some
reforms to land ownership during this time, but the Ba’ath government largely inherited the
TAPU system.227
Iraq was controlled by the Ba’ath regime from 1968 to 2003, with Saddam Hussein at the
helm from 1979 until his overthrow during the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the United Statesled coalition. Hussein led a secular Sunni Arab government that oppressed the Shia majority
and other ethnic minority groups. Individual and new group rights for property were
recognized during the Ba’athist regime; communal ownership was encouraged during the
early socialist years; and the TAPU system was replaced with the Real Estate Registration
Law. 228 This Law improved the issuance of titles and created Real Estate Registration
Departments throughout the country. This system continues today and most land is
registered under it (about 96%).229
During the Ba’athist regime, many non-Sunni Iraqis were denied their property rights for
ethnic, religious, and political reasons. 230 The government frequently engaged in forced
displacement and property expropriation or destruction policies to consolidate its power.231
These policies targeted political enemies as well as Shia Arabs and ethnic/religious minorities
(Assyrians, Turkmen, and Yazidis). Several specific policies undertaken by the regime were
“Arabisation policies” that displaced non-Arabs in the north (e.g. Kirkuk) with Sunni Arabs
from the south; the Al-Anfal campaign and other politically motivated punishment for
opposition to the regime (specifically Kurds); the expulsion of “disloyal” Shias of Iranian
origin during the 1980s; and the “crony capitalism” policies that allowed Ba’athist allies to
take land they desired.232 These policies displaced about one million Iraqis.233
After the 2003 invasion, the United States-led coalition retained a significant presence in
Iraq over the next decade. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) ran Iraq under military
occupation immediately following the occupation but it quickly ceded some power to the Iraq
Interim Governing Council and then to the Iraqi Interim Government, a caretaker
government. Elections in 2005 (the first in fifty years and boycotted by Sunni Arabs) led to a
transitional government and then a series of uneasy, elected governments. Many Sunni
Arabs who had been moved to northern Iraq during the “Arabisation” policies were forcibly
ejected from their residences following the 2003 invasion.234 “Bogus” titles to land increased
during this time of instability.235
Though there have been some periods of relative stability, Iraq has continued to face serious
political instability, violence, regional turmoil, and terrorism, leading to significant civilian
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deaths since the 2003 overthrow of Hussein.236 Al-Qaeda and, more recently, ISIS insurgents
have posed a serious threat. ISIS has retained control of major Iraqi areas, including Fallujah
and Mosul, since 2014, leading to airstrikes by the US and other foreign powers and the
resignation of the government. Since the 2003 invasion, “land and property rights violations
have persisted and periodically increased due to the mass displacement and political turmoil
between 2006 and 2008 and again in early 2014.”237 About four million additional Iraqis were
displaced from 2003 to 2008.238
B. Property Rights and Claims
There were several potential claimants of disputed land that were relevant to the land
restitution and land reform efforts post-2003. The most relevant groups included individuals
who had lost their property to discriminatory Ba’athist policies; individuals whose property
had been destroyed during the Ba’athist regime; and individuals who were driven from their
homes after the 2003 invasion.
Individuals who had lost their property to discriminatory Ba’athist policies included those
who were targeted by the Arabisation policies in the north and the crony capitalism
supported by the Ba’athist regime. This group mainly comprised Shia Arabs and
ethnic/religious minority groups.
Individuals whose property had been destroyed during the Ba’athist regime, due to the AlAnfal or other campaigns, were often similar to those targeted by discriminatory policies. For
example, farmers had their property taken under discriminatory policies and the property on
these farms destroyed. Many of the victims of property destruction were ethnic minorities.
Individuals who were driven from their homes after the 2003 invasion were often the Sunni
Arabs who had been moved to the northern regions under the Arabisation policies. Many
were poor and did not have anywhere to go after they were driven from the property after
Hussein and the Ba’athist regime fell.

C. Policy and Legal Responses
Property disputes were a serious concern following the 2003 invasion. Especially in strategic
areas such as Kirkuk and Kurdistan, there was a real concern that conflicting property claims
would lead to increased instability across the country. Because most properties from which
people had been displaced were at that point occupied by poor residents with nowhere else to
go, the government faced a dilemma over how to address these disputes.239 While specific
policies have changed, since 2003, the Iraqi government has encouraged refugees and
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internally displaced persons to return to their homes, with public awareness campaigns and
grants to aid resettlement.240
To address conflicting and longstanding property claims in Iraq in 2003, the Iraqi
government, at that point led by the coalition under the CPA, created the independent, quasijudicial Commission for the Resolution of Real Property Disputes (CRRPD).241 The CRRPD
was later renamed the Property Claims Commission (PCC). When the Iraqi interim
government took over from the CPA, the commission generally kept the same mandate but
with some changed policy approaches. Both the CRRPD and the PCC were at all times staffed
entirely by Iraqi nationals, with international involvement mostly limited to the
International Organization for Migration (IOM) providing technical assistance.242
The primary goal of the commission was to process, collect, and adjudicate property disputes
stemming from the acts of the Ba’athist regime. The Iraqi government in control after the
CPA ceded power strongly felt that those who had lost property rights under the Ba’aths
deserved restitution. 243 As such, the commission only had jurisdiction over claims from
between 1968 and 2003.244 The commission had mandates over “(1) confiscation or seizure of
property for political, religious or ethnic reasons or in relation to ethnic, sectarian or
nationalistic displacement; (2) appropriation or seizure of property without consideration,
with manifest injustice or in violation of the applicable legal rules; and (3) state property
allocated to the members of the previous regime without consideration.”245 These categories
demonstrate that the group for which systematic redress was possible was those whose
property had been forcibly taken by the Ba’aths and not those whose property was destroyed
or who lost non-real estate property. Individuals who had long-standing leases that were not
formally registered (a common practice) and farmers without formal documentation
generally received no help from the commission.246
The PCC set up thirty decentralized branches and thirty-five judicial committees to process
and adjudicate property claims. 247 The commissions allowed for both compensation and
property restoration mechanisms. Victims had the right to property restoration where the
property was in the hands of the government, a high-ranking Ba’ath member, or a person
who had taken “advantage” of the victim; otherwise, the victim could request restoration or
compensation. If granted restoration where the secondary occupant had bought the property
in good faith, the secondary occupant could apply for compensation.248 Experts testified at
hearings on the valuation of property, based on value at the time of the claim. The party that
first sold the property after the victim lost it (generally the government) had to pay this
compensation, though government payment was slow and hesitant.249 All parties had the
right to appeal.
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With the help of the IOM, the commission set up a web-based property claims system and an
online database of property records. 250 The IOM also assisted the PCC with training,
information dissemination, awareness, and out-of-country claims (needed due to the number
of Iraqi citizens who fled Iraq during and after the Ba’athist regime). 251 By 2005, about
500,000 displaced persons had returned to their homes; by 2009, the PCC had received about
150,000 claims; about 67,000 had been decided while compensation had been paid in only
1,000.252
Land restitution and land reform efforts have also been shaped by regional variation,
especially in areas like Kurdistan where multiple governments vie for power and, therefore,
have not been stable across Iraq. Land registration and dispute resolution is complicated in
Kurdistan by the ongoing struggle between the central government and the Kurdistan
Regional Government which officially share power over the territories.253 The unstable region
of Kirkuk has also proved a challenge and faced difficult problems with property dispute
resolution. The IOM, as well as the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI),
have continued to prove assistance with “local dialogue and negotiations” to address these
disputes.254 Additionally, the government has not proved amenable to the policy of robust
restitution. Instead, the Ministry of Finance regularly appeals any decision from the CRRPD
that requires the government to financially compensate a victim or to relinquish governmentowned property.255
The PCC did not have jurisdiction to address the property disputes arising from post-2003
displacement. People facing property disputes from post-2003 displacement often have to rely
on the local courts for assistance. This is in part because this crisis is ongoing and the
government does not have the capacity to address property resolution at the moment. 256
However, the government did set up limited administrative help under the Council of
Ministers Decree 262 and Order 101 to specifically address recovery for people displaced
during 2006 and 2007 who met strict criteria (e.g. they were displaced to a neighboring
country for less than eight months).257 Multiple agencies with unclear roles and few resources
were assigned to these claims and there was no dedicated body or oversight.258 Claimants
could submit claims at two return centers and go through the process, which was complicated
and required significant documentation.259
This process was not well known; only 500 or so applicants went through the centers (with
about half succeeding in their claims) while 10,000 registered to receive a grant to help with
resettlement (few received it). 260 Secondary occupants of these homes, since they did not
receive official state approval as they did during the Ba’ath regime, were subject to criminal
sanctions.261
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D. Lessons Learned
There are several lessons that can be gleaned from Iraq’s uneven experience with land
restitution and land reform. First, it is hard to properly assess the success of the PCC and
the CRRPD: the ongoing, high levels of violence and displacement in the country never
allowed the commissions to be truly tested. This suggests that, in any country where conflict
and violence is ongoing, expectations for what land restitution and land reform systems can
accomplish must be correspondingly lowered.
Second, Iraq’s differing regions complicated efforts around land restitution. There were some
attempts to address regional differences in Kirkuk and the Kurdistan regions, for example,
but no systemic attempts to make the federal policy nuanced enough so as to incorporate all
the relevant regional, ethnic and historical differences. More deliberate attempts to do so
would likely have increased the success of the program and perhaps even have helped with
broader reconciliation efforts, as groups that have been historically marginalized would have
seen their concerns validated.
The specific policies followed in Iraq, while not fully tested, generally provide guidance on
how not to set up a land restitution system. The commissions have been criticized for the
“isolated” approach that they took to property resolution; for failing to integrate in a cohesive
manner with other country policies; and for failing to integrate many vulnerable groups into
the property dispute resolution process: these trends suggest that, even were the context less
volatile, the CRRPD would not have been able to significantly improve reconciliation and
peace efforts in Iraq.262
The setup of the Iraqi land dispute resolution system also shows how substantive flaws might
be created by procedural flaws; in Iraq’s case, shown through its hurried, isolated, and noninclusive approach to setting up the system. The PCC and the CRRPD were pragmatic
approaches to property disputes largely driven by the anti-Ba’ath politicians that took power
following the 2003 invasion. This created two major problems with the system. First, the
property dispute resolution mechanisms were created with a sense of urgency that made
them isolated, rather than integrated into the broader attempt at transitional justice. 263
There was little effort to consider how to use the property dispute mechanism as a way to
heal the country and prepare it for democratic governance. Instead, the second problem arose,
the approach was non-inclusive and focused just on the targets of the Ba’ath regime.264 The
administrative process addressing 2007–08 claimants has primarily been criticized for
applying to an overly narrow subsection of potential claimants, and for poor administrative
coherency.265
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The Iraqi experience also demonstrates why administrative processes that minimize
government involvement will often be preferable in land dispute resolution processes to
judicial and quasi-judicial mechanisms. As mentioned above, the decision of the Ministry of
Finance to appeal almost all adverse decisions and the right to appeal for all parties, led to
an enormous backlog in decisions and a lack of certainty over ownership.266 In addition, the
decision to use a judicial, rather than an administrative process, similarly led to slow
resolution of cases and was seen as the incorrect type of system given the huge number of
cases to decide.267
7) CASE STUDY 5: KOSOVO
A. Background
As with BiH and the other former Yugoslavian states, Kosovo’s complex experience with land
restitution and land reform has been marked by ethnic conflict, political instability, and the
move from a centrally-planned socialist economy to a market one. 268 Since gaining
independence in 2008 and officially ending its period of international oversight in 2012, it
has shown significant development of laws protecting property rights but successful
implementation of these laws has proven more elusive.269
A former part of the Ottoman Empire, Kosovo was split between the Kingdoms of Serbia and
Montenegro following the First Balkan War in 1912–13, both of which eventually joined the
Kingdom of Yugoslavia following World War I. In 1937, a survey of Kosovar land was
completed under the Turkish tapi system, which occurred without surveying measurements,
using a piecemeal system marred by population movements driven by conflict.270 Albanians
in Kosovo—the majority population but marginalized, often illiterate, and hesitant to pay
steep tapi taxes—were essentially excluded from this process and their property was listed
as government owned.271 The tapi system formally provided only possessory, not ownership
rights, to land. This system remains at the “core” of land registration in Kosovo, although
“informal land transactions” are most commonly used.272
Temporarily a part of Albania during World War II, Kosovo became a part of the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia following the war. Kosovo was recognized as the Autonomous
Province of Kosovo and Metohija, a part of the Socialist Republic of Serbia. The majority of
land remained in private use throughout the socialist era, but the state did take control
(without compensation) of significant amounts of agricultural land known as socially owned
enterprises (SOEs) and of urban land (“construction land”). 273 The right to private land
ownership was formally recognized in Kosovo by Yugoslavian law in 1989.274
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Kosovo began pushing for increased independence as soon as 1981. This resulted in a
backlash in which the Serbian-controlled government removed Kosovo’s autonomous
governing authority by 1990.275 The following ten years are known as the “discriminatory
period” for the discriminatory policies faced by the non-Serbian Kosovars, particularly
Albanians. Discriminatory housing laws, such as legislation that canceled property sales by
Serbs to Albanians, drove many Albanians from their homes.
A war for Kosovo’s independence, within the context of the Yugoslav Wars, began in 1998.
This war, the population displacement it caused, and the destruction of government buildings
housing land registration documents destroyed many existing land titles.276 An intervention
by NATO allowed Kosovo to reclaim its autonomy in 1999. Prior to 1999, Kosovo had no
effective institutions for recording or defining land rights.277
The United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) administered Kosovo until 2008 when
Kosovo formally declared independence. Serbia still does not recognize its independence.278
UNMIK did not alter the right to private land ownership granted to Kosovo by Yugoslavia.279
It did set up the Housing and Property Directorate and the Housing and Property Claims
Commission to deal with controversy over land claims.280 UNMIK also established the Kosovo
Trust Agency (KTA) to privatize the 12% of Kosovar land comprising SOEs. 281 The
Privatization Agency of Kosovo (PAK) replaced the KTA in 2008. Since 1999, UNMIK,
Kosovo, and other actors have worked to create a workable system of land rights in Kosovo.
B. Property Rights and Claims
There were several different groups with property rights and claims that had to be considered
when Kosovo began land restitution and land reform after the 1998 war. These include the
following: individuals who had owned property before socialization; individuals who lost
property due to the discriminatory policies of the 1990s; individuals who fled from property
during the war in 1998; individuals living in illegally built property; and minority
populations, particularly Serbs.
Individuals who owned property before socialization were of all ethnicities. These rights were
largely supported by the flawed tapi records, discussed above, which left many Albanians
with no formal rights over their ancestral property. Many of these land records had been
destroyed during the war.
Individuals who lost property due to the discriminatory policies of the 1990s were mainly
Albanians. During this period, the central Serbian government revoked Kosovar autonomy
and implemented policies that discriminated against non-Serbs in the province.
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Individuals who fled from property during the war in 1998 were of all ethnicities and had
often left their houses and apartments on short notice. In the months following the end of the
war, many of these properties had been occupied by new residents without the permission or
knowledge of the prior residents.
Individuals living in illegally built property were primarily Kosovo Roma, Ashkaeli, and
Egyptian communities. Many had lived in property for decades under informal terms. These
properties were systematically destroyed during and after the war.282
A final group that merited special attention during the Kosovar land restitution and land
reform was minority populations, particularly Serbs. Although Serbia controlled Kosovo until
1999, Serbs were a minority within Kosovo, who complained of discrimination at the hands
of the local government.
C. Policy and Legal Responses
The primary land reform approach applied in Kosovo was to privatize land through the sale
of SOEs. 283 The KTA and its successor, the PAK, adopted the position that the prior
ownership status of socialized land did not need to be determined.284 As such, this land is still
being privatized and auctioned on an ongoing basis, generally in large parcels. While several
other former Yugoslav states adopted a similar policy, many paired it with restoration of land
where possible, compensation, or distribution of land, none of which Kosovo chose to
pursue.285 Kosovo’s chosen policy has precluded the option of future physical restoration for
land that was seized by the socialist Yugoslav regime.286
The other primary policy was to return residential properties to their pre-war owners who
had been displaced by the war or who had lost property due to the discriminatory housing
policies of the 1990s (primarily Albanians). 287 UNMIK set up a two-bodied mass claims
mechanism under the Housing and Property Directorate (which ran the administrative body
of the claims mechanism) and the Housing and Property Claims Commission (which was a
quasi-judicial commission). These were later transformed into the Kosovo Property Agency
(KPA) and the Kosovo Property Claims Commission with the same mandates. The judicial
bodies were set up to complement the administrative bodies because the Kosovar judiciary
was still fledgling and was not prepared to adjudicate the claims.288
The Directorate (later KPA) had a number of roles in post-conflict Kosovo. It both provided
guidance about the “overall direction” of Kosovar property rights and conducted an inventory
of abandoned housing and aided in renting that housing.289 However, its primary role was
resolving property disputes. Residential property claims were divided into three categories:
claims by persons whose occupancy rights were revoked after March 23, 1989, based on

51

discriminatory legislation (these were primarily Albanians targeted by the discriminatory
housing legislation of the 1990s) (Category A); claims by persons who voluntarily entered into
informal transactions of residential property after March 23, 1989 (Category B); and persons
who owned, possessed, or had occupancy rights to residential property prior to March 24,
1999 but no longer had possession of the property and had not voluntarily transferred it
(generally, refugees and IDPs) (Category C).290
The Directorate considered claims made by individuals who had lost their residences.
Claimants did not need to prove causation (for example, that the conflict had directly caused
them to leave their homes), which removed a potential barrier to claimants’ success. The
Directorate had the exclusive jurisdiction over claims under any of these categories. Its
decisions were final, enforceable, and not subject to review by another body (though it could
review its own decisions).291 Claims were only considered if submitted by a set deadline but
that deadline was extended three times (until the final date of July 31, 2003).292
Ultimately, the claim resolutions bodies succeeded in adjudicating 99.7% of the
approximately 27,000 property claims before it, though far from all of these led to
repossession of property, often due to security concerns and limited cooperation between
agencies. 293 Category C claimants (displaced persons) lodged about 93% of claims. 294
Restoration was the preferred outcome by the Directorate (though many individuals
preferred to sell their houses once they obtained possession of them) and the Directorate
rarely provided monetary compensation. The primary subset of cases where compensation
was allowed was where there were competing occupancy claims. Compensation was allowed
when a Category A individual was granted restoration of a residence that a Category C
individual had purchased after the discriminatory policy had removed the property from the
Category A individual. The Category C claimant, or secondary occupant, was then entitled to
compensation for the purchase price paid.295
Since the Directorate was facing a crisis with over a hundred thousand destroyed homes and
few functional land records, it was given a conservative, narrow jurisdiction that was deemed
manageable. 296 Specifically, agricultural land and other non-residential property were
excluded from the restitution process; no compensation was available for most lost properties.
Many criticized this approach as not adequately providing a comprehensive property dispute
resolution scheme.
Also, some noted that victims of discriminatory policies were given preference over those who
had lost property as the result of the war.297 This was because, at the time the Directorate’s
mandate was drafted, the huge number of displaced persons (generally Serbs) was not yet
recognized and Albanians who had been victims of discriminatory policies had been
understood to be the primary victims of the conflict.298
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In 2006, the KPA replaced the Directorate. Its jurisdiction was expanded to include the
ability to resolve disputes over agricultural and commercial property. 299 Claims were
accepted until December 3, 2007, and any claims filed after that date are heard before general
civil courts.
D. Lessons Learned
Several of the basic lessons learned from the Kosovo land restitution and land reform process
mirror those first learned in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Those are addressed in the BiH
section and not repeated here (see Part V.3).
The land restitution and land reform project in Kosovo has generally not been seen as a
success. USAID refers to Kosovo as having “poorly defined and enforced property rights,”
particularly for women and minority communities.300 It is characterized by the “absence of
an effective property rights regime.”301 This is in large part due to the fact that the rotating
entities responsible for the state did not work to create a uniform property system, but
instead left in place systems from various regimes that conflict with each other and added
reforms without integrating them with the existing system (or explicitly abrogating the old
system).302 As in BiH, the focus of the post-conflict land restitution and land reform was to
return to the pre-conflict status quo, not to remake the system.
Specific flaws from the post-war land policies are also apparent. For one, the setup of the
Directorate unintentionally had a disparate impact on the Kosovo Serb population. It
underestimated the number of displaced peoples in this population (about 100,000) and failed
to adequately compensate them. Over 17,000 Kosovo Serbs ended up launching claims
against UNMIK and other entities. The United Nations put aside most of these claims and
few were ever tried.303
Unlike in BiH, the Directorate also provided restitution for only residential, not commercial
or agricultural, property (as it based the restitution on the principle of the “right to return
home”).304 This negatively affected minority communities and the ability of many Kosovars
to return to their pre-war economic activities, often agricultural.305
The Directorate also provided no support for the Roma and other minority communities who
had their longstanding, but informally owned, properties destroyed.306 This came in spite of
international human rights protections, specifically from the UN Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, for groups living in informal property schemes.307 The Roma and
other minorities were essentially denied the right to return to their homes.
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Limited cooperation between the Directorate/KPA and the “return” agencies (which helped
displaced persons return to their homes) limited the success of property resolutions, showing
that increased agency cooperation would have helped the success of the complaint resolution
mechanism.
Finally, the split in jurisdiction between the Directorate/KPA and regular courts created
some confusion. It was not always easy to determine whether property claims fell under one
of the categories over which the Directorate/KPA had a mandate. For example, where a claim
fell under Category C but the original purchase was flawed, it would fall to a local court, not
the Directorate/KPA, to determine the validity of that claim. These rulings often conflicted
with the Directorate/KPA findings and left parties with no final resolution.308
8) CASE STUDY 6: ZIMBABWE
A. Background
European colonists began to enter Zimbabwe in the 1850s, upsetting local community rule
and property systems. The country, now known as Zimbabwe, was declared Rhodesia in 1890,
and the country faced significant land grabs by the colonists who drove the African
populations into reservations (now called communal lands). 309 Land was given to “white”
settlers and soldiers and taken from Africans without compensation. This became official
under the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 and the Land Tenure Act of 1969.310
Demands for independence began around 1960 and was marked by armed rebellion and
sporadic battles until the country gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1980.311
Zimbabwe’s land restitution and land reform efforts date back to this time, which marked
the end of white minority rule, and were formalized in the 1980 Lancaster House Agreement.
The challenge faced by the incoming government was enormous. As one might expect,
Rhodesian white farmers had seized the vast majority of arable and fertile land. Indeed,
approximately 6,000 large-scale white farmers owned nearly all arable, fertile land in the
country.312 The government’s reform efforts sought, at least ostensibly, to redistribute land
in a more equitable manner and improve the lot of landless black farmers. Throughout the
years, Zimbabwe’s government failed repeatedly to carry out a uniform, preplanned process,
but rather, continuously revised (sometimes drastically and with little respect for human
rights) its policies in response to social, economic and political pressures. For this reason, it
makes sense to divide Zimbabwe’s reform process into discrete phases, each of which is
summarized below.
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B. Property Rights and Claims
There were several different groups with property rights and claims that had to be considered
when Zimbabwe began to reform its land ownership and system following independence. The
groups involved in this process were primarily white landowners from the colonial period and
native black Africans.
White landowners, as discussed above, had been given land by the colonial government prior
to 1980, and had possession of a majority of the land in the country.
Native black Africans had been dispossessed of much of their land during the colonial period,
under formal and informal mechanisms. Many of these individuals were farmers or low-wage
workers. At the time of independence, many were living on reservations and did not have
their own property.
C. Policy and Legal Responses
Phase I – Consensual Land Sales: Following the Lancaster House Agreement, the new
government promised not to force white farmers off their lands for a period of 10 years.313
The government therefore adopted a policy where it would buy land from willing white
farmers and redistribute the land to black peasants.314 Ultimately, some 3 million hectares
were purchased and redistributed; far short of the government’s 8 million hectares goal.315
Among the main reasons for the slow progress was the government’s diversion of funds for
other purposes.316 Another important reason is that the government’s increased demand for
large-scale land dramatically increased prices, resulting in holdouts by white farmers. The
government determined that a more coercive mechanism was needed.
Phase II – Coercive Acquisitions: Starting in 1990, the government, no longer constrained
by the Lancaster Agreement, began implementing more coercive measures. To this end, the
government amended the constitution to permit compulsory land purchases. It also passed
the Zimbabwean Land Acquisition Act of 1992.317 The bill empowered the government to
coercively purchase land it deemed unproductive, but only in exchange for compensation.
While the law did not require the government to pay full market value, it did give landowners
some latitude to negotiate prices with the government; it also amended the constitution to
enable land redistribution.318 It is also noteworthy that international donors supported this
phase of land redistribution reform. Britain, for example, provided land assistance grants to
facilitate redistribution and compensation.319
But undermining the government’s legal efforts were a faltering economy and political
cronyism. Indeed, by the late 1990’s, only around 1 million hectares were purchased and
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redistributed. 320 As of 1999, 4,500 farmers—most of them white—owned over 11 million
hectares of all the country’s land.321 The causes were twofold. First, rather than distributing
much of the purchased land to landless black farmers, the government gave the lands to
ZANU-PF party loyalists—who were otherwise inexperienced with farming techniques.322
These tracts were then rented for profit to the very people who were supposed to benefit from
the program.
Another contributing factor to the program’s dubious track record was Zimbabwe’s
continuous economic decline. Throughout this period, Zimbabwe’s large-scale farmers
continued to produce much of the country’s food supply and exports. Given the government’s
reliance on these farmers’ output, many large-scale farms were left undisturbed.323 However,
Zimbabwe’s dire economic prospects also had other, countervailing impacts. Perhaps most
importantly, the ongoing economic calamity sharply increased political pressure on Mugabe
to hasten the redistribution process by any means necessary.
Phase III – Land Grabs: Responding to mounting popular pressure to hasten the reform
process, the government first attempted to pass by referendum a constitutional amendment
empowering the state to seize white farmland without compensation in 2000.324 When the
amendment was defeated in a referendum, the government proceeded to (materially) support
forceful seizures of farmland by army veterans and landless peasants. To lend a measure of
legal legitimacy to the land grabs, the government passed the Rural Land Occupiers Act of
2001.325 The act essentially shielded occupiers from legal sanction or eviction.
In the meanwhile, the government launched what became known as the Fast Track Land
Reform Program. The new redistribution program essentially codified the constitutional
amendment that voters rejected in a referendum. The program had several salient features.
First, it designated some 3,000 farms for compulsory acquisition, although in practice far
more farms were seized. 326 Rather than passing new legislation, the government simply
deleted many due process procedures from the 1992 law, calling the amended version the
Land Acquisition Act of 2000.327 Perhaps most importantly, the amended version empowered
the government to seize land without compensation, aside from “improvements” made to the
land.328 In addition, the 1992 law was amended to require only seven days’ notice before the
government could forcibly seize the farm.329 In an effort to minimize court challenges, the bill
was further amended to free the government from the obligation to personally serve the
farmer with notice before seizing the farm. In practice, evictions were carried out, without
even semblance of due process by paramilitary forces of army veterans linked to ZANU-PF.
Once “acquired,” the land would be re-plotted. Some was to be plotted into large-scale farms,
for which the government would earmark resources to invest in commercial agriculture. The
remainder was to be re-plotted into small-scale farms, to be occupied by landless peasants.330
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The process was beset by administrative difficulties and continuing violence. Indeed, much
of the acquisition was accompanied with violent assaults on the original landowners.
Moreover, given the government’s dwindling revenues, the newly resettled farmers received
little to no government training or financial support. 331 As a result, the country’s once
impressive food production plummeted, further increasing food insecurity and violence. As
was common in previous redistribution efforts, much of the land was not redistributed based
on need, but rather, on the basis of party loyalty.
Ultimately, some 8.3 million hectares were seized and 127,000 blacks farmers were resettled
a part of the Fast Track Land Reform Program.332 Some studies suggest that most of the land
was distributed to landless black farmers and low-wage laborers in towns.333 Still, as can be
expected, ZANU-PF loyalists and army veterans have received a disproportionate share of
the land.334 Moreover, given the chaotic, violent nature of the redistribution program, few
provisions were made for ousted black farmers who formerly lived on the land.335 They were
often ousted, along with their employers, without even a veneer of due process or
compensation.
D. Lessons Learned
Relevant lessons can be learned from each phase of Zimbabwe’s land restitution and land
reform process. Zimbabwe’s largely unsuccessful “Consensual Land Purchase” policy imparts
two lessons that may be pertinent to Myanmar, should its government opt to purchase and
redistribute land to IDPs. First, it is important to set modest goals. Some experts suggest
that it was never likely that Zimbabwe’s government could purchase so much land given its
relatively modest resources—a problem which Myanmar’s government shares as well.
Second, and perhaps most importantly, Zimbabwe’s effort illustrates that a purely
consensual land restitution and land reform policy is likely unfeasible. That much is almost
assured by the forces of supply and demand—as demand for land goes up, so do prices. The
prospect of higher land values also makes holdouts more likely, necessitating some coercive
measures.
Ultimately, the relative inefficiency of a purely consensual land restitution and land reform
regime, coupled with fledgling legal institutions, in turn makes grassroots violence a
particularly likely outcome. It might therefore be better to combine a consensual regime with
some coercive elements.
Zimbabwe’s failure to achieve its redistribution objectives illustrates the importance of
maintaining accountability and transparency in the redistribution process. Of course, the
Fast-Track Redistribution program generated numerous additional impacts, beyond the
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scope of this memo. However, it can be said with confidence that, to the extent that Myanmar
contemplates a similarly ambitious land-reform process, Zimbabwe’s flagrant human rights
and rule of law violations serve as a cautionary tale. As aforementioned, Zimbabwe’s
longwinded reform process further illustrates the importance of maintaining transparency
in the reform process, as well as the need to combine some coercive elements into an
otherwise consensual land purchase/redistribution regime. Finally, in light of the challenges
that accompany an undertaking as tremendous and complex as a land restitution and land
reform program, it is important to set expectations modestly, particularly in a country where
the rule of law remains weak.
PART VI: OVERALL LESSONS LEARNED
The case studies above illustrate successes, challenges, failures, and innovations in land
restitution and land reform mechanisms. As illustrated in the Appendix, which subjects each
case study to a compliance analysis with the Pinheiro Principles (discussed in detail in Part
V.2.A), the case studies reveal broader insights that raise useful inquiries and considerations
for Myanmar and other countries that are considering pursuing land reform or land
restitution.

1) DEFINE THE SCOPE: Properly defining the scope and providing a
clear timeline for land restitution efforts facilitates effective
implementation. In particular, it is important to determine at the
outset whether the goal is to address immediate disputes or take on the
underlying, more complex legal and policy issues.

Each country faces a gateway decision concerning the scope and ambition of its land
restitution and land reform undertaking. In BiH and Kosovo, the goal was specifically to
return those recently displaced to the status quo. 336 In Zimbabwe, the process proved
impossible to implement in an effective and peaceful manner because it was expansive,
ambitious and resource heavy.337
The case studies demonstrate that focusing on the immediate conflict can help limit the
number of implicated disputes and make the resolution process easier. However, where
underlying reform is needed and not addressed, a narrow approach to dispute resolution may
not fix necessary underlying issues. This is illustrated by the “neo-feudal”338 character of BiH
today and the ongoing chaotic land situation in East Timor.339 In both situations, the land
dispute resolution focused on relatively narrow subsets of the overall land scheme in the
country. Even though the land dispute resolutions in both countries were seen as successful,
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they did little to address these overarching issues facing land rights in the country, which
continue to this day.
This decision depends in part on the type of crisis and/or displacement the policy is meant to
address. Zimbabwe was addressing the legacy of colonialism on land ownership (Part V.8)
while Kosovo narrowly wanted to rectify displacement resulting from the 1990s conflict (Part
V.7). The scope and nature of the corresponding land restitution and land reform efforts
reflected those underlying drivers. In Myanmar, individuals with land disputes have been
displaced in many different ways: some are IDPs and refugees displaced by conflict; others
have faced land seizures so that land can be used by the government or companies (for more
on the specific challenges facing land conflicts in Myanmar, see Part III). At the same time,
fundamental reforms foreseen in the National Land Use Policy regarding clarification of
customary land rights, are yet to be realized. This makes it particularly important for the
scope and intentions of any land reform or land restitution program adopted in Myanmar to
be very clear about whose claims and which underlying issues it is trying to address.

2) FLEXIBILITY AND EVOLUTION: Approaches that are flexible and
change as needs evolve tend to be more impactful.

The most successful processes in ongoing- and post-conflict environments appear to be
flexible, tailored to local conditions and often rely on non-formal legal institutions. When
creating land restitution and land reform policies, countries generally have to consider how
to best adapt the mechanisms of these policies to their particular context and the strength of
the legal sector. Some key facets are noting whether a chosen policy, as in Zimbabwe (Part
V.8), is failing to adequately address the motivating policy concern and stopping or modifying
that policy to prevent further damage. Taking into account the purpose of the land restitution
is critical; in BiH, policymakers realized that land restitution had to include farm land in
order to truly return people to the status quo and their former livelihoods, a consideration
not fully appreciated in Kosovo (Parts V.3 and V.7). The East Timor example (Part V.7) also
shows how local, community institutions can be incorporated into a formal government policy
to improve its efficiency.
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Related to tailoring the solution to the country’s context, countries have to decide whether to
structure their land restitution and land reform process in a way that is final or that is
ongoing and adaptive to changes. While a finalized system with clear deadlines provides
people with clarity and certainty, the land restitution and land reform process in Zimbabwe
(largely unsuccessful as a model), demonstrates some of the reasons governments need to
reflect on what has been a success and what has not when undertaking land reform and land
restitution. 340 Interim and short-term policies can allow flexibility for the government to
adjust policies that turn out to be less successful than anticipated.
3) DETERMINE FORMALITY OF MECHANISMS: Administrative, judicial,
or informal approaches or some combination of the three should be used as
appropriate to the particular context.

There are three primary types of processes for restitution mechanisms: administrative,
judicial (or quasi-judicial), and informal processes. A process can also incorporate aspects
from several of these categories. There are advantages and disadvantages to each of these
mechanisms and one may be more appropriate than the other depending on the context. Like
Myanmar, East Timor and Iraq had significant number of refugees and IDPs. The experience
of these countries demonstrates that, when dealing with a high number of claimants, a
judicial or quasi-judicial process is sometimes inefficient. For example, in Iraq the judicial
process led the government to hear too many cases, which created a bottleneck and ongoing
confusion over land rights.341 Meanwhile, the informal mediation process used in East Timor,
which included local community mediation outside of official state processes, resulted in high
rates of successful resolution of claims and respect for traditional land rights.342

4) INCORPORATE TRADITIONAL LAND RIGHTS: Traditional land rights
should be accounted for in restitution mechanisms.

According to some estimates, approximately 57% of the land that has recently been
confiscated in Myanmar was customary land. 343 In such cases there is a need for land
restitution and land reform programs to address the role that customary tenure has in the
country, and the ability of actors to take advantage of the weaker formal legal protections for
this land.
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In two country studies, East Timor and BiH, incorporation of traditional land rights led to
successful mechanisms.344 East Timor did so through its local mediation mechanism and BiH
by recognizing the rights of residents of socially-owned land. Though it may be more
administratively difficult to extend land restitution to land whose ownership cannot be
proven through official land records, the experience in these countries shows that a
comprehensive policy requires this inclusion. Failure to do so would exclude numerous
landowners with traditional claims to land.

5) CONSIDER USE OF CUSTOMARY INSTITUTIONS: Traditional, local,
and/or customary institutions can provide useful for a implementation of
a restitution mechanism.

Similarly, traditional or customary institutions can sometimes be more resilient in conflict
than state institutions.345 This is seen through the greater degree of success experienced by
the ad hoc mediation system in East Timor, based on local customs concerning land rights,
than the formal administrative system created by the government. Post-conflict
environments are often characterized by collapsed or weakened state structures. Therefore,
customary institutions (where they exist) can be a first point of entry for addressing land
disputes and it is useful to provide these traditional institutions with targeted support as
more formal legal institutions become functional.346
However, various considerations should be at the forefront when considering the use of
customary institutions. For example, while incorporating customary practices demonstrates
respect for indigenous peoples and their connection to land that they might not formally own,
any land reform or land restitution policy must not re-entrench traditional power dynamics
by not scrutinizing inequalities latent in customary practices. Section 13 discusses the
importance of assessing whether a land tenure system, whether customary or statutory, has
inadvertent human rights effects on minority or women populations.

6) ADOPT LOCAL, REGIONAL AND FEDERAL APPROACH: Local, regional
and federal strategies should be incorporated into a land restitution
policy to ensure proper coordination.

Part III of this Report explored the regional nature of land use and land disputes in
Myanmar, implicating varying types of customary tenure, armed conflict, parallel governing
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parties, and displacement of populations. Countries like Indonesia and Iraq have faced
similar challenges with extreme regional differences. Experts on land restitution in
Myanmar are divided about the implications of this regional variation: some think regional
approaches must be attempted, while others believe a federal policy poses the best chance for
success despite regional variation.347 The solution to this question is not an easy or clear
one—just as it is not in countries like Indonesia and Iraq, which faced similar difficulties of
implementing federal policies in semi-autonomous regions—but any attempt at land reform
or land restitution in Myanmar must account for these regional differences, whether that is
done by creating regional approaches or a federal program with the flexibility to respond to
the different stakeholders and land disputes throughout the country.

7) CONSIDER A STAGGERED APPROACH: Where stability of the country
and capacity of government is not reliable, a mechanism that upscales in
stages may be preferable.

Myanmar, like many countries that undergo land restitution and land reform processes, such
as Iraq and Zimbabwe, is still facing significant internal challenges. The experience from
Iraq shows that, when conflict is ongoing, expectations should be tempered and attempts at
land reform and land restitution shaped with the actual capacity of the government in mind.
Facing similar contexts, some countries have favored a staggered approach where the initial
steps are, as seen in East Timor,348 interim or stop-gap measures that stem the land crisis
before a more broad-reaching policy can be applied once the country has stabilized.
Each of the countries profiled also demonstrates the importance of a minimum set of reliable
institutions being in place before land restitution can take place, which relates closely to the
additional challenges that arise when a country attempts to undertake land restitution or
land reform while conflict is ongoing. Specifically, weak, partisan, or underfunded agencies
put in charge of land restitution in countries from Iraq and Zimbabwe to BiH and Kosovo at
times compromised the potential success of land restitution (Part V, Sections 3, 6, 7, and 8).
The limited attempts so far at confiscated farmland restitution (not of IDPs) that have
occurred in Myanmar through the Investigation and Reinvestigation Committees
demonstrate that this will likely be a challenge in the country, as agencies have faced high
volumes of complaints and many failed to lead to “adequate redress.” 349 These countries’
experiences show that robust judiciaries or separate, well-funded, and independent
administrative adjudicative groups are essential to successful attempts at land restitution.
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8) ACCOUNT FOR LONG-TERM INSTITUTION BUILDING: Long-term
institution building should be a component of mechanism to ensure
sustainability and effective transitions .

Restitution efforts run the risk of being short-sighted in that the immediate concern is
resolving already existing land disputes. However, resolution of existing disputes should be
made with an eye towards establishing or at least transitioning to a more stable system that
will allow for effective resolution of future disputes.350
The United Nations Interagency Framework Team for Preventative Action, which is run by
the UN Development Program, recommends an institutional approach as “the only
sustainable approach to systematically addressing land-related conflicts.” 351 Strong and
coordinated institutions can help ensure that land grievances are addressed, that land
disputes are regulated, and that land conflicts can be avoided. This helps the post-conflict
period to result in a sustainable peace. Important institutions in this context include the
national government, local governments, the judiciary, land administration institutions (both
statutory and customary), and traditional/religious leaders. Reliable mechanisms for dispute
resolution, generally independent from these institutions, must also be set up and
coordinated with these other institutions. Dispute resolution mechanisms are necessary to
ensure that these state organs can together work to successfully make, implement and
enforce rules.
9) POTENTIAL FOR INTERIM PROTECTIONS: Weigh the advantages and
disadvantages of interim and transitional protections which may provide
immediate relief.

Myanmar, as with most of the countries surveyed, also faces concerns over the additional
problems created by land dispute resolution. Secondary occupants, for example, generally
have few resources to move to new locations. One policy that addressed this issue was in BiH,
where secondary residents were promised reciprocity and not required to relinquish their
current housing until their previous housing, from which they had been displaced, was made
available. 352 Lesser protections for secondary residents and interim protections for those
newly displaced were undertaken in East Timor, among other countries.353
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10) LAND RESTORATION OR COMPENSATION: Redress should be tailored
to community needs and circumstances of the recipient and take into
account relevant factors such as use of land and access to financial
institutions .

Any land restitution policy has to decide whether to offer land compensation or restoration,
or both. This is a complicated choice informed by both practical and political considerations.
The country case studies presented demonstrate that land restoration has, in practice,
generally been the preferred type of land restitution mechanism. The governments in BiH
and Iraq,354 for example, did not have enough funds to start a robust compensation program,
a reality likely facing Myanmar as well. Political concerns were also raised in BiH and
Kosovo, among others, that compensation would lead to, in essence, an official approval and
concreting of forced displacement and ethnic segregation. These on-the-ground outcomes
track the guidance from literature such as the Pinheiro Principles and the Voluntary
Guidelines that suggest restoration is generally preferred to compensation (as discussed in
Part II.2).
Many experts on land restitution in Myanmar similarly believe that restoration is likely the
preferred form of restitution: people rely on specific types of land for their livelihood—return
to just any land is not necessarily sufficient—and many also hold deep communal, ancestral,
and cultural connections to the specific land from which they were dispossessed. 355 As
discussed in Part III.4 of the Report, there are also concerns that many in Myanmar may not
have the sophistication to properly invest compensation for land and such compensation will
not succeed in putting that population into a comparable situation to where they were before
their displacement.
Still, there are countervailing considerations in Myanmar context, as in any country, brought
up by experts interviewed for this study. In some circumstances land restoration is a
significant challenge because of ongoing conflict and secondary occupants; sometimes the
land was seized for a company or government project that is ongoing; some land has been
promised to three, four, or even five parties over time that all believe they are the legitimate
owner of the land.356 In addition, many refugees and IDPs, particularly from Karen state,
have been displaced for over twenty years. After living in urban camps for decades—and, for
younger people, not knowing anything else—many displaced persons may not wish to return
to rural environments.357
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11) CONSIDER IMPLICATIONS OF DEFINITIONAL CHOICES : Making
deliberate choices about legal definitions .

The definitional choices made about land dispute resolution, even those that appear
relatively minor, can have significant consequences. Country case studies provide insight
into clauses that may end up having significant effects.
Ø Burden of proof. In Kosovo, for example, claimants did not have to prove causation
(e.g. that they lost their property as a result of the conflict) when putting in claims
for loss of property. 358 This made the process more claimant-friendly and less
administratively burdensome. Decisions about what burden of proof will be
required to demonstrate ownership or other claim to land will be critical.
Ø Eligibility of Property. Another choice is what types of property are eligible for the
resolution process, a choice highlighted in the Pinheiro Principles. While both
residential and non-residential property was eligible in BiH, for example, Kosovo
generally only provided resolutions for residential property.359 This is a particularly
important decision when many claimants (e.g. farmers) might rely on non-residential
land for their livelihood, as in Kosovo and Myanmar.

12) RESOLVING EXISTING CONFLICT OF LAND LAWS AND POLICIES:
Review and survey of existing land laws and policies should identify
inconsistent, unclear, or conflicting laws and either remedy them or
identify which take priority.

Given the complicated domestic legal framework currently in Myanmar, experiences in BiH
and Iraq concerning inconsistent laws and unclear precedence of laws and decisions may be
relevant. The unclear patchwork of laws in Iraq played a significant role in preventing a more
successful resolution of the land disputes there.360 Similar problems were seen in BiH at first,
but the decision to make the CRPC’s binding decisions take precedence over conflicting laws
allowed for the resolution process to achieve greater success.361 In Myanmar, this process
should include not just making the legal structure consistent and clear, but also resolving
the unclear legal state of refugees, IDPs, and residents of customary land.
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13) ADDRESS HUMAN RIGHTS AND ENSURE NON-DISCRIMINATION:
Design a mechanism that includes ongoing assessment of potential for
discrimination and adverse human rights impact in compliance with
international standards.

An explicit Pinheiro principle, and one whose importance can be seen in the case studies, is
that any process should be non-discriminatory. This is also a requirement under the
international treaties introduced in Part II. The legitimacy of processes that appear to favor
one group or that have disparate effects on certain populations are more easily called into
jeopardy and are often less effective at adequately addressing the underlying concerns, as
seen in Iraq and Kosovo.362 There was a failure on the part of all the countries studied, to
some degree, to comply with international standards regarding affirmative nondiscrimination against women, ethnic minorities, and indigenous people, as demonstrated by
a lack of reliance on international treaties or law regarding the same.
Discriminatory effects can be unintended or not immediately evident and so it is critical to
consider the potential adverse human rights and equality implications of land restitution and
reform mechanisms. For example, experts have noted that the formal registration of land
where only one individual can be the owner of that land can lead to the formalization of a
patriarchal land system, where the male head of household is listed as the owner of the
land. 363 The incorporation of customary institutions and land tenure can raise similar
concerns of discrimination on the basis of gender or other unlawful basis, as can the
implementation of a statutory tenure system without proper consideration of the gendered
effects it may have (such as giving formal title only to the male head of household). As such,
any land restitution or land reform process must be scrutinized to assess and remedy
discrimination impact at the outset.
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Appendix: Assessment Chart
ASSESSMENT OF LAND RESTITUTION EFFORTS BASED ON PINHEIRO PRINCIPLES
(UN PRINCIPLES ON HOUSING AND PROPERTY RESTITUTION FOR REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS)
COUNTRY
FACTOR

Was the land
restitution and
land reform
process a
success?

BOSNIA &
HERZEGOVINA
Moderate:

EAST TIMOR

INDONESIA

IRAQ

KOSOVO

ZIMBABWE

Moderate:

Too soon to tell:

No:

Low-moderate:

No:

Within mandate to
return land rights
to pre-conflict
status quo, seen as
success. Did not
address broader
property concerns,
specifically
concerning vague,
inconsistent laws.

Mediation model
for addressing
conflict was
introduced by the
UN Transitional
Administration in
2000 and is now
managed by East
Timor's Land and
Property
Directorate.
Despite difficult
circumstances
and limited
resources,
mediation has
been successful in
managing a large
number of
potentially violent
disputes.

President Joko
Widodo just
announced
Indonesia’s land
reform program
in Feb 2017, and
funding from the
World Bank was
approved in
March 2017. The
grant is to help
Indonesia’s
indigenous and
local
communities
secure land
rights and
manage forests.

While some
claimants were
able to reclaim
possession of
houses, process
was backlogged,
slow, and political.
Continuing
turbulence in
country affected
ability of system to
be truly tested.

Within mandate
to return land
rights to preconflict status
quo, successfully
resolved many
claims but with
lingering
concerns. Did
not address
broader property
concerns,
specifically
concerning
vague,
inconsistent
laws.

Process
accompanied
by violence
and
paramilitaries.

COUNTRY
FACTOR

To what extent
was the statedevised
procedure
transparent?

BOSNIA &
HERZEGOVINA
Moderate

EAST TIMOR

INDONESIA

IRAQ

KOSOVO

ZIMBABWE

Moderate:

Moderate

Moderate

Moderate

N/A

It was first
implemented
under supervision
of United
Nations.
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COUNTRY
FACTOR

Did the state
facilitate
public access to
reform
program?

BOSNIA &
HERZEGOVINA
Yes:

EAST TIMOR

INDONESIA

IRAQ

KOSOVO

ZIMBABWE

Yes, generally:

Yes:

Yes:

Yes:

N/A

Over 90% of those
displaced by
conflict received
binding rights to
their pre-conflict
properties (though
not all were able to
repossess).

The East Timor
Judicial
Monitoring
Program found
that resolving
land disputes
through
mediation was
more effective
than going
through the court
system; local
settlements of
disputes are seen
as subject to less
corruption, but a
large limitation is
that the
Directorate
cannot mediate
land owned by the
state, or where
the state or
government
official is a party
to the dispute.

The Indonesian
government
wants to reduce
inequality by
redistributing
land to rural
groups of people.
12.7 million
hectares are set
aside to be
distributed and
managed by
indigenous
people.

Active attempts to
make process
known included
awareness
programs and webbased applications/
information.

Final deadline
for claims
extended three
times. Received
27,000 claims.
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COUNTRY
FACTOR

To what extent
was there
transparency
when
mechanism was
created?

What was the
level of
transparency in
resolution of
each individual
dispute?

BOSNIA &
HERZEGOVINA
N/A:

EAST TIMOR

INDONESIA

IRAQ

KOSOVO

ZIMBABWE

Transparent:

Relatively
transparent:

Low:

N/A:

High

But appears to
have been
transparent
process:
international
community heavily
involved, insisted
on reliable
monitors,
commission
reflected inclusive
approach (ethnic
diversity).

Originally created
by the UN
Transitional
Administration.

Largely created
within
government.

But appears to
have been
transparent
process:
international
community
heavily involved.

N/A:

Seems relatively
transparent:

N/A:

High:

N/A:

Resolution of
individual
disputes has not
yet occurred.

Because of the
judicial and appeal
process, relatively
high transparency
about each case.

But appears to
have been
transparent
process that
followed
procedures.

But appears to
have been
transparent process
that followed
procedures.

A party brings the
dispute and then
the opposite
parties are
notified;
mediation does
not commence
until all parties
are present.

Largely created
by Indonesian
government, but
also in
conjunction with
the World Bank.
There has been
much press
covering the
program.
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N/A

COUNTRY
FACTOR

To what extent
was the statedevised
procedure nondiscriminatory?

To what extent
was the statedevised
procedure
gendersensitive?

What type of
property was
eligible for
claims?

BOSNIA &
HERZEGOVINA
High:

EAST TIMOR

INDONESIA

IRAQ

KOSOVO

ZIMBABWE

Moderate:

Moderate:

Low:

Low-moderate:

Low:

Commission
reflected ethnic
diversity and
policies adopted to
ensure all ethnic
groups treated
equally. Some
concerns about
"victor's solution"
regarding
treatment of
soldiers.

Given that the
disputes are
mediated at a
local level,
discrimination is
probably
lessened.
However, the
state and
government
officials are
exempt from this
mediation.

The program’s
purpose is to
increase welfare
of rural
communities and
indigenous
people. However,
the details of the
program are
unclear.

Process was
generally seen to
favor majority Shia
in power post2003. Informal
renters or farmers
with poor
documentation
(often minorities)
had no recourse.

Process was
facially nondiscriminatory
but ended up
favoring
displaced
Albanian
population over
Serbs, no
protections for
minority
populations
(such as Roma).

Process was
highly
discriminatory
.

No prominent
efforts to integrate
gender-sensitive
approach.

N/A

No prominent
efforts to
integrate gendersensitive
approach.

No prominent
efforts to integrate
gender-sensitive
approach.

No prominent
efforts to
integrate
gender-sensitive
approach.
Concerns that
property system
more broadly
unfair to women.

N/A

All (residential,
commercial,
agricultural)

All land

Agrarian land

All real estate

Residential

N/A
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COUNTRY
FACTOR

Are agencies
assigned to deal
with restitution
program
properly staffed
given their
caseload?

Are agencies
assigned to deal
with restitution
program
properly
funded?

BOSNIA &
HERZEGOVINA
Yes:

EAST TIMOR

INDONESIA

IRAQ

KOSOVO

ZIMBABWE

Yes:

Too soon to tell:

No:

Yes:

No

Dispute resolution
committee (CRPC)
appears to have
been adequately
staffed, though it
relied on local,
domestic agencies
for implementation
of decisions.

Appears to be
properly staffed.

The Indonesian
government has
urged regional
administration to
coordinate with
relevant agencies
to speed the
implementation
of agrarian
reform program.

Significant backlog
of cases, at initial
decision and
appeal level.

Yes:

Yes:

Likely yes:

No:

Dispute
resolution
committees
(Directorate, and
others) appear to
have been
adequately
staffed.
Hindered by
poor agency
cooperation.
Yes:

No

CRPC appears to
have been
adequately funded.
Compensation
Fund, which was
supposed to be
funded by
international
donors and support
monetary
compensation, was
not funded.

Appears to be
adequately
funded, mediation
activities are
funded by the
Directorate,
which is a selffunding agency as
a result from
leases over public
land.

Appears to be
adequately
funded; the
World Bank has
approved a
$6.25M grant to
help specifically
with Indonesia’s
indigenous
communities.

Compensation
depended on
government
providing
compensation,
which rarely
occurred.
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Dispute
resolution
committees
(Directorate, and
others) appear to
have been
adequately
funded.

COUNTRY
FACTOR

To what degree
were agencies
independent
from state or
partisan
control?

BOSNIA &
HERZEGOVINA
High:

EAST TIMOR

INDONESIA

IRAQ

KOSOVO

ZIMBABWE

Moderate:

Moderate:

Moderate:

High:

Low:

International
community heavily
involved, insisted
on neutrality.
Initial problems
with local
obstruction were
addressed.

At the beginning,
it was
implemented by
the UN, but now
it is run by a
directorate most
likely tied to the
state; when
mediators are not
mediating, they
are performing
other land
administration
duties.
At the outset, yes:

It seems as
though the bulk
of the on-theground
implementation
will be through
regional
administrative
agencies, with
oversight from
the state.

CRRPD/PCC were
independent, but
government had
control over some
aspects of process.

International
community
heavily involved,
insisted on
neutrality.

Process coopted by
ZANU-FP
(ruling party).

Unclear:

Yes

Yes

No:

The mediators
received intensive
training in 2001
and 2005 but
there are no
mechanisms for
ongoing or
recurrent
mediation
training.

It is too soon to
know the details
of the program.

Yes
Does the state
provide specific
guidelines to
particular
agencies so as
to ensure
standardized
institutional
practices?
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Land largely
distributed on
basis of party
affiliation.

COUNTRY
FACTOR

What was the
proportion of
IDPs that
submitted a
claim to the
agency tasked
with
implementing
the program,
and how
quickly were
these claims
resolved?
What was the
proportion of
IDPs whose
land rights
have been
restored, or
alternatively,
have been given
restitution,
since the
inception of the
restitution/
restoration
program?

BOSNIA &
HERZEGOVINA
N/A, but high
proportion:

EAST TIMOR

INDONESIA

IRAQ

KOSOVO

ZIMBABWE

About a third:

N/A:

N/A:

N/A:

N/A:

Two million were
displaced and
within nine years,
one million had
returned.

Of the 972
disputes brought
to the Land and
Property
Directorate
between
December 2000
and January
2006, 314 were
resolved through
mediation.

Still unclear.

But about one
million were
displaced
(internally and
abroad) due to
policies related to
CRRPD/PCC
mandate and about
150,000 claims
were placed by
2009. 67,000 had
been resolved.

But high
proportion.

Recipients
were not
IDPS.

High:

N/A

N/A

Low:

High:

Moderate:

By 2009, about
67,000 of 150,000
claims were
resolved. Only
1,000 had been
compensated.
Significant backlog
(claims and
appeals).

99.7% of 27,000
claims
completed,
generally
resulting in
returning land
rights.

127,000 (total,
vast majority
not IDPS).

Within nine years,
90% of claimants
displaced by
conflict received
binding rights to
their pre-conflict
properties (though
not all were able to
repossess).
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COUNTRY
FACTOR
To what extent
were affected
IDP
communities
consulted as to
the reform
efforts and
what were the
means by which
consultations
were
implemented?

BOSNIA &
HERZEGOVINA
N/A:

EAST TIMOR

INDONESIA

IRAQ

KOSOVO

ZIMBABWE

N/A:

N/A:

N/A:

N/A:

Low:

Appears low –
driven by
international,
government actors.

Mediation
mechanism.

Appears to be a
top-down reform
by the state in
conjunction with
international
actors.

Appears low –
driven by sitting
government.

Appears low –
driven by
international,
government
actors.

Process largely
designed by
ZANU-PF.

High:

High:

Moderate:

N/A

Indonesia has an
extensive
registration
system, but is
ineffective in its
high cost and
poor
management.

Registration
available,
including through
online system.

Restored land
was registered,
though not if
claimant did not
originally have
formal property
rights. Property
system overall
remains poorly
managed.

Significant
consultation on ad
hoc community
dispute
resolution.

Moderate:
To what extent
did the state
provide an
effective means
to register land
that has been
restored to its
original
owners?

Success:

Restored land was
filed in newly
created "cadastral
database," though
not if claimant did
not originally have
formal property
rights. Property
system overall
remains poorly
managed.

N/A
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COUNTRY
FACTOR
Extent to which
reform effort
incorporates
and recognizes
customary
means of
property
ownership (i.e:
collective
means of
ownership)

BOSNIA &
HERZEGOVINA
High:

EAST TIMOR

INDONESIA

IRAQ

KOSOVO

ZIMBABWE

High:

High:

Low:

Low:

Low:

Process recognized
rights of those who
had occupied
socially-owned
property.

This mediation
program was
created to address
disputes over
customary land
ownership.

The agrarian
land reform
program is
targeted towards
restoring land to
customary
communities.

Process recognized
only those with
significant
documentation of
claim.

Process did not
recognize rights
of those in illegal
housing.

Uniform
registration
process.
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COUNTRY
FACTOR

BOSNIA &
HERZEGOVINA
N/A

EAST TIMOR

INDONESIA

IRAQ

KOSOVO

ZIMBABWE

N/A

N/A

N/A, but appears
low:

N/A

N/A:

In case of an
undocumented
claim (physical
evidence of an
IDPs ownership
has been
destroyed or
does not exist),
has the state
provided for an
impartial,
speedy judicial/
administrative
procedure by
which to
determine facts
related to such
undocumented
claims?

Process recognized
only those with
significant
documentation of
claim.
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Recipients
were not
IDPS.

COUNTRY
FACTOR
Has the state
provided for a
means to
address and
protect the
human rights of
legitimate
secondary
owners acting
in good faith?

BOSNIA &
HERZEGOVINA
Yes:

INDONESIA

IRAQ

KOSOVO

ZIMBABWE

N/A

N/A

Yes:

Yes:

No:

Compensation.

Generally,
compensation.

White farmers
largely forced
off their land
absent any
compensation.

Yes

Yes

No:

Condition of
reciprocity.

Yes

Are (and the
extent to which)
implementation
efforts carried
out through the
rule of law?

EAST TIMOR

Yes:

Yes

The mediation
system is
embedded in land
administration
rather than
judicial
administration,
which allows
remedies
unavailable in the
courts, such as
selling, leasing,
dividing, or
swapping land.

Coercive
evictions were
largely carried
outside legal
process by
violent
paramilitary
groups.
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COUNTRY
FACTOR

Has the state,
through
implementing
statute(s),
clearly
delineated
those entitled to
restitution/land
restoration?

BOSNIA &
HERZEGOVINA
Yes:

EAST TIMOR

INDONESIA

IRAQ

KOSOVO

ZIMBABWE

N/A

Yes

Yes:

Yes:

No

Individuals who
had property
seized or lost due
to displacement,
discriminatory
policies under
Ba'ath regime.

Individuals who
lost property due
to the
discriminatory
policies after
1989;
individuals who
voluntarily
entered into
informal
transactions of
residential
property after
1989;
individuals who
fled from
property during
the war in 1998–
99.

Individuals who
had abandoned
their property
during the 1990s
conflict, including
those without
formal property
rights.

Not those whose
property was
damaged.

Not those who had
their property
socialized under
Yugoslavia.

Not those who
had their
property
socialized under
Yugoslavia.
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COUNTRY
FACTOR

BOSNIA &
HERZEGOVINA
Restoration.

What form of
restitution
offered to IDPs
was favored?
N/A

EAST TIMOR

INDONESIA

IRAQ

KOSOVO

ZIMBABWE

Selling, leasing,
dividing, or
swapping land.

Restoration.

Restoration.

Restoration.

N/A :

N/A

N/A

N/A

Recipients
were not
IDPS.
N/A

If monetary
restitution: Did
an independent
tribunal
determine that
restoration of
land rights was
not possible?

80

N/A

COUNTRY
FACTOR

If addressed
through
restoration:
Has the state
provided a
monetary
restitution
mechanism for
those who do
not wish to
return
voluntarily?

BOSNIA &
HERZEGOVINA
No:

EAST TIMOR

INDONESIA

IRAQ

KOSOVO

ZIMBABWE

N/A

No

No:

Sometimes:

N/A

Compensation was
theoretically
possible for most
claimants, but
rarely paid by
government.

Only particular
groups were
eligible:
secondary
occupants
during the
conflict, where
original owner
lost property due
to
discriminatory
laws (this group
was favored in
restoration
process).

A Compensation
Fund was
envisioned but
funding relied on
international
donors and was
never realized.
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